Endogenous location leadership

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the centre to delay the follower's entry, leading to a non-maximum differentiation outcome. We also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader's location and firms' values and, in particular, numerically show that the profit of the leader changes nonmonotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter.

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“…4 Lambertini (1997) and Meza and Tombak (2009) considered the endogenous timing of locations in such static Hotelling models.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Ebina

Matsushima

Shimizu

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…For even lower setup costs, entry can no longer be deterred by the incumbent. Meza and Tombak's (2009) model uses uniform distribution, "sufficiently high" reservation prices, quadratic transportation costs, and potentially different production costs. The paper suggests a three-stage model, in which timing (of entry), location, and price are determined.…”

Section: Ud1 Linear Market Nash Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Location Science

2015

130

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“…Tyagi (2000) examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures. 3 Meza and Tombak (2009) extended the model of Tyagi (2000). They discuss an asymmetric location-price model with a Hotelling line.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They discuss three main topics: (1) endogenous timing of entries (locations), (2) mixed strategies of location, and (3) comparison between the social optimum and equilibrium locations. Based on the model of Meza and Tombak (2009), we allow the efficient firm to license its advanced technology to the inefficient firm. They negotiate the contract term.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

Matsumura

Matsushima

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractInnovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new products by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a firm launches a new product, product positioning is also an important matter. Using a standard linear city model with two firms, we investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser affects the product positions of the firms. We find that the inventor more likely chooses the central position when its bargaining power is weak. We also discuss the welfare implication. We find that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal.JEL classification: L13, O32, R32

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Endogenous location leadership

Cited by 33 publications

References 33 publications

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model

Location Science

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

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