Endogenous formation of networks for local public goods

Cho, Myeonghwan

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0182-5

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…We define the ability that each author creates original knowledge as creativity, and measure it via knowledge creation cost, c. For the time being, we focus on homogeneous knowledge creativity of players but will show in Section 3.2 and Section 4 that the main insight is robust to differentiated knowledge capabilities 10 .…”

Section: Individual Author's Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The URL of the Electronic Companion is provided at the end of this paper. 10. In Section 3.2 and Proposition 4 of Section 4 we modify the cost of knowledge creation to be individual-specific, and therefore differentiates knowledge capabilities.…”

Section: Individual Author's Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other direction, [18] studied a problem of network formation, but considering public goods as exogenously endowed to agents in the network. [10] modeled networked public goods supply under a bargaining framework. In evaluating the author's utility regarding knowledge, we technically examine a payoff scheme similar to the works in the above literature, especially [16].…”

Section: Introduction and Literature Back-groundmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Citation Networks and the Emergence of Knowledge Core

Zhang

2015

IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng.

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Observations on the citation networks often confirm a core-periphery structure: A clustered group of artifacts possess the core knowledge to the field, which is widely cited by artifacts at periphery. We explain this as an outcome resulted from decentralized knowledge contributions from individuals who maximize their own utilities. Our model sheds insights on how knowledge creation, knowledge citation, and knowledge heterogeneity affect the emergence of knowledge core, in both cases of direct and indirect citations. We find through simulations that the core-periphery architecture of citation networks is robust to generalizations on knowledge heterogeneity and knowledge creativity. By studying the incentive rationale that underlies the growth of citation networks, our research has potential implications on the design and administration of intellectual communities.

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Section: Individual Author's Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Individual Author's Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction and Literature Back-groundmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Citation Networks and the Emergence of Knowledge Core

Zhang

2015

IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng.

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“…7 See for example, Allouch (2015Allouch ( , 2017, Baetz (2015), Cho (2010), Elliott and Golub (2019), and Kinateder and Merlino (2017), model an agent benefits from the contributions of not only those who nominated him but also those who he himself nominated. This ability to piggy back on the (potentially large) contributions of other agents helps the system rule out inefficient equilibria.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Goods in Networks with Constraints on Sharing

Gerke¹,

Gutin²,

Hwang³

et al. 2019

Preprint

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This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially excludable along social links. Individuals face a capacity constraint in that, conditional upon providing, they may nominate only a subset of neighbours as co-beneficiaries.Our model has two typically incompatible ingredients: (i) a graphical game (individuals decide how much of the good to provide), and (ii) graph formation (individuals decide which subset of neighbours to nominate as co-beneficiaries).

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“…Models of sequential network formation were introduced by Aumann and Myerson (), in which formations of links are sequentially proposed, and players on both sides of links decide whether to approve the connection. An institutional detail is added by Cho () applying the framework of sequential bargaining, in which the level of local public goods and the shape of the network are both proposed, and players involved in the network decide whether to approve the proposal through unanimous votes. My model also focuses on the collective decision‐making of network formation, but with the assumption of multistage voting and sophisticated voting by players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributive politics of public goods networks through multistage voting

Kurosaka

2019

J Public Economic Theory

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Public goods networks create conflict between districts needing the network and districts that pay the costs. Thus, it is difficult for pork barrel politicians to achieve logrolling with other districts. I show that logrolling is possible for such politicians if they set their agenda properly. To show this, I model the centralized decision‐making process as a multistage vote among representatives from different districts. I assume the districts are better off if and only if the public good “connects” them to the network. Public goods can be provided universally by setting the agenda properly, even when costs exceed the benefits.

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Endogenous formation of networks for local public goods

Abstract: Networks, Local public goods, Sequential bargaining game, Stationary perfect equilibrium, Core, C78, D85, H41,

Cited by 11 publications

References 13 publications

Citation Networks and the Emergence of Knowledge Core

Citation Networks and the Emergence of Knowledge Core

Public Goods in Networks with Constraints on Sharing

Distributive politics of public goods networks through multistage voting

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