End-to-End Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Different Physical Unclonable Functions

Abstract

We propose the first authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol with different physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our protocol allows for two end-users each holding a distinct PUF-embedded device and a long-term secret to agree to an authenticated session key. For malicious behaviors on the PUF-embedded device, we first define a Device query, which models an adversary who intentionally (or unintentionally) picks up an arbitrary device and attempts to input a message and obtain an output. As per the author's knowledge, this is the first study to consider Corrupt queries that return long-term secrets in the PUF-embedded device and its relevant platform. In this paper, we prove that our protocol is secure under a new security model and requires three flows to achieve a secure AKE with users' distinct PUFs. As it requires no intervention by a central server after its initial setup phase, it is suitable for practical decentralized networks.

Deep PUF: A Highly Reliable DRAM PUF-Based Authentication for IoT Networks Using Deep Convolutional Neural Networks

“…Most of the existing PUF technologies such as DRAM PUFs utilize helper data algorithms and ECCs to improve the reliability and robustness [ 14 , 19 , 20 , 28 , 29 , 30 ]. However, using helper data may leak some information about the secret keys, and ECC circuits cause significant hardware and software overheads.…”

“…Most of the existing PUF-based authentication methods for IoT applications exploit strong PUFs, such as delay-based PUFs, which require dedicated circuits. Additionally, most of these methods rely on complex error correction algorithms to extract reliable responses, leading to add extra overheads to the device [ 19 , 20 ]. Using DRAMs as the major components of many devices can eliminate the need for dedicated PUF circuits.…”

PDAKE: A Provably Secure PUF-Based Device Authenticated Key Exchange in Cloud Setting

“…We use the same notion of session identifier, partner id, partnering as it is defined in [3], [9]. Definition 12 (Session Identifier, Partner id, and Partnering [3], [9] 4). On the other hand, all C(U , 1), C(U , 2), C(U , 3), and C(U , 4) are true then it also becomes true regardless of C(S, 1) and C(S, 2).…”

“…It has been the first attempt to generally build a PUF-based multi-factor AKE with provable security. Very recently, a new end-to-end different PUF-based authentication has been proposed by Byun [4]. It enables for two different users who each has own distinct PUF-embedded device to establish an authenticated key exchange [4].…”

“…Very recently, a new end-to-end different PUF-based authentication has been proposed by Byun [4]. It enables for two different users who each has own distinct PUF-embedded device to establish an authenticated key exchange [4]. In this paper, we focus on an authenticated key exchange protocol in a device based authentication setting where an user has a PUF-based device and its multi-factor authenticators desire to mutually authenticate a server.…”