End of consensus? Ideology, partisan identity, and affective polarization in Finland 2003–2019

Abstract

Finland is traditionally associated with a consensus-like political culture, low partisan hostility and consistent levels of ideological polarization. Despite this, concerns about political polarization are widespread. A possible explanation is that affective polarization, a phenomenon characterized by increasing emotional distances between political groups, is increasing. This paper examines trends and individual level predictors of affective polarization in the Finnish electorate between 2003 and 2019, using survey data from five national election studies. Additionally, it contributes to the theoretical understanding of affective polarization in multiparty settings by introducing a measure based on the absence of neutrality towards parties.The results show a general increase in affective polarization over the period and identifies ideological extremity as the main predictor of the phenomenon. While the impact of ideological positions on the left-right scale didn't change according to any discernible pattern over time, positions on the GAL-TAN scale begun driving affective polarization in 2011. The importance of sociocultural issues has since increased and having a strong TAN position became the strongest predictor of affective polarization in 2019. Feeling close to a party had a more consistent effect on affective polarization, albeit not as large as ideological extremity.Increasing affective polarization might undermine the prevailing consensus culture in Finnish politics. However, it might also have positive effects as a corrective to voter apathy, leading to increased participation. This makes Finland an interesting case for further studies of the causes and effects of affective polarization.

Exploring differences in affective polarization between the Nordic countries

“…Polarization has also been higher in Sweden, although the scores dropped in 1994 and 1998 to values similar to the top notations for Iceland, Finland and Norway and then further to scores around the averages for these three countries in 2002 and 2006 (see Oscarsson et al, 2021). The perhaps most interesting feature of Figure 1 is, however, the recent increases that have taken place in Sweden, Iceland and Finland, which others have documented as well (see Kawecki, 2022; Kekkonen & Ylä‐Anttila, 2021; Oscarsson et al, 2021). Likewise, the scores for Denmark have been at a relatively high level since the 2007 election, and there is an increase in Norway if the CSES data are used instead.…”

“…Figure 1 first explores long‐term trends in affective polarization for the five Nordic countries. To be clear, these time trends have for the most part already been outlined in single case studies (e.g., Kawecki, 2022; Kekkonen & Ylä‐Anttila, 2021; Oscarsson et al, 2021; Reiljan & Ryan, 2021) and larger cross‐country analyses (e.g., Gidron et al, 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021). Yet, it is worthwhile to focus on all Nordic countries together and to highlight some important comparative trends.…”

“…In terms of Nordic countries, recent studies have shown increases in affective polarization in Sweden and Finland during recent election years (Kawecki, 2022;Kekkonen & Ylä-Anttila, 2021;Oscarsson et al, 2021) and that people in Norway, Finland and Sweden display polarized feelings toward supporters of out-parties, that is, negative trait ratings and a willingness to distance oneself socially from out-party supporters (Kekkonen et al, 2022;Knudsen, 2021;Renström et al, 2020Renström et al, , 2022. However, since the research field is still at an early stage and based on single case studies, there are potentially valuable insights to be made from studies that bring together trends in affective polarization for the Nordic countries.…”

Online polarization and identity politics: An analysis of Facebook discourse on Muslim and LGBTQ+ communities in Finland

“…In such posts, liberals are not seen as political opponents, but more intensively as enemies. Referring to popular far‐right trope of cultural decay, one poster representing Finns Party for example claimed that “we live currently the golden era of gay‐ and leftist decay.” Describing other actors in a hostile manner with organic metaphors, often used by extremists (Cassam, 2021), may increase the calls for their exclusion from a “healthy society.” As Kawecki (2022) among others suggests, this may be a sign of an increasing polarization between parties.…”

“…Describing other actors in a hostile manner with organic metaphors, often used by extremists (Cassam, 2021), may increase the calls for their exclusion from a "healthy society." As Kawecki (2022) among others suggests, this may be a sign of an increasing polarization between parties.…”