Encoding Under Trust and Distrust: The Spontaneous Activation of Incongruent Cognitions.

Abstract

Past studies of strategic thinking have shown that the encoding of the message information becomes more complex under distrust. Receivers process the information as if they are trying to protect themselves from being misled by testing alternative potential interpretations. The present study investigates the possibility that when people are mistrustful they spontaneously activate associations that are incongruent with the given message. Findings from 3 experiments suggest that, even when the distrust is unrelated in any meaningful way to the message and even when receivers are unable to prepare a strategic response, the cognitive system reacts to distrust by automatically inducing the consideration of incongruent associations--it seems designed to ask, "and what if the information were false?" The theoretical implications of the results for theories of social perception and persuasion are discussed.

Suspicious spirits, flexible minds: When distrust enhances creativity.

“…Furthermore, a neutral control group was added. So far, trust manipulations have repeatedly yielded similar results to the control conditions in experimental studies (Klimoski & Karol, 1976;Schul et al, 2004;cf., Schul et al, 2008), most likely because trust constitutes a default state. Without reasons for doubt, we typically have trust in others (e.g., Berg et al, 1995;McKnight et al, 1998;cf., Gilbert, 1991).…”

“…I, therefore, chose to manipulate distrust in a subtle way and to separate the distrust manipulation from the creativity task. This approach has been taken not only in previous research on distrust (Rotenberg et al, 2010;Schul et al, 2004Schul et al, , 2008, but also in research on other important interpersonal variables like social power . Specifically, Studies 1, 3, and 4 employ a subliminal priming procedure embedded in a lexical decision task.…”

“…In many contexts, distrust is not only justified but rather a highly-adaptive response to protect oneself from exploitation by untrustworthy others (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005;Kramer, 1998). To serve this vital function, distrust seems to come along with cognitive activity suitable to counteract deceptive attempts (Schul et al, 1996(Schul et al, , 2004(Schul et al, , 2008.…”

“…Furthermore, states of unfocused distrust are likely to be triggered by cues that are typically seen as being related to deception (e.g., certain facial or vocal features; see DePaulo et al, 2003;Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004;Stirrat & Perrett, 2010;Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996). Alternatively, an instant of focused distrust may transfer to a subsequent, unrelated situation, and linger as unfocused distrust (cf., Schul et al, 2008).…”

“…In case of such an integrated distrust representation, even subtle cues to deception should be capable of evoking the whole mental representation, i.e., a distrust mindset (cf., Schul et al, 1996Schul et al, , 2004Schul et al, , 2008). …”