2014
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-10557-4_28
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Enabling Cross-Domain Reuse of Tool Qualification Certification Artefacts

Abstract: Abstract. The development and verification of safety-critical systems increasingly relies on the use of tools which automate/replace/supplement complex verification and/or development tasks. The safety of such systems risks to be compromised, if the tools fail. To mitigate this risk, safety standards (e.g. DO-178C/DO330, IEC 61508) define prescriptive tool qualification processes. Compliance with these processes can be required for (re-)certification purposes. To enable reuse and thus reduce time and cost rela… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The second line of research has focused on the creation of assurancecase arguments by analyzing various types of artifacts. In the context of product lines, besides the approaches described in the introduction [38,41,18,45,46,47], most notable contributions come from the latter group [31,74,73,16,32,50].…”
Section: Argumentation Reusementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second line of research has focused on the creation of assurancecase arguments by analyzing various types of artifacts. In the context of product lines, besides the approaches described in the introduction [38,41,18,45,46,47], most notable contributions come from the latter group [31,74,73,16,32,50].…”
Section: Argumentation Reusementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As defined by Gallina et al [6], a safety-oriented process line is a process line focusing on processes for engineering safety-critical systems/product lines. In the framework of safety critical systems engineering, a process line might be introduced at several levels: to model intra-domain processes [24] that slightly vary due to different safety integrity levels (e.g., ASIL A, ASIL B, etc in the automotive domain); to model crossdomain processes [25] that vary due to different safety integrity level types (e.g., ASIL, DAL-Design Assurance Level, in the automotive and avionics domains). Desired single processes can be derived from the process line by selecting and composing appropriate reusable process elements.…”
Section: A Safety-critical Product Linesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first line of research has focused on capturing safety case patterns that have been successfully used to argue for different properties [10,15] while the second line of research has focused on generating safety case arguments from various types of artifacts [14,26,37]. In the area of PLE, most notable contributions [14,18,19,21,26,36,37] come from the latter group.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As argued in Section 1, the present paper considers development and assurance of arbitrary PLs and consequently relies on CBS paradigm where the constructed assurance case argues for system level properties instead of only SEooC. The line of research in [18,19,21] introduces approaches for constructing safety case fragments that target particular requirements from various domain-specific safety standards. A notable aspect of these approaches is the attention to processes and their assurance with respect to standardized practices.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%