Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers

Hotchkiss, Julie L.; Quispe-Agnoli, Myriam

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1459045

Cited by 29 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…2 Boal (1995), Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), Ransom and Oaxaca (2010), Hirsch, Shank and Schnabel (2006), Hirsch (2007), Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009), Ransom and Sims (2010), Hirsch, Shank and Schnabel (2010), Falch (2010), Lambson (2011), Falch (2011) Dube, Lester and Reich (2011) and Webber (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The elasticity of labor supply to the firm over the business cycle

Depew

Sørensen

2013

Labour Economics

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Recent empirical work has found evidence that the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms is finite, implying that firms may have wage setting power. However, these studies capture only snapshots of the elasticity. We are the first to study how it changes between economic contractions and economic expansions. To do this, we extend the current identification strategy by relaxing the assumption that a firm replaces all separations with recruits. We take our identification strategy to data by studying two manufacturing firms during the volatile interwar period. Our analysis suggests that the elasticity is lower during recessions than expansions, providing evidence of differential wage setting power over the business cycle. This differential wage setting ability renders an alternative explanation of the pro-cyclicality of real wages and provides a deeper insight into the phenomenon of jobless recoveries.Contact Briggs Depew at bdepew@email.arizona.edu and Todd Sorensen at todd.sorensen@ucr.edu. Feedback received at

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The elasticity of labor supply to the firm over the business cycle

Depew

Sørensen

2013

Labour Economics

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“…It is also possible that documented-undocumented wage gaps reflect other factors besides productivity gaps. Some studies (Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2009, David Brown et al 2013, Hirsch and Jahn 2015 suggest that undocumented workers are often not paid their full marginal product. Clearly, their bargaining power is diminished by their lack of legal status, and employers can appropriate a larger part of the surplus generated by the employer-employee match.…”

Section: Exploitation Of Undocumented Workersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economic Effects of Providing Legal Status to DREAMers

Ortega

Edwards

Hsin

2018

IZA Journal of Labor Policy

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This study quantifies the economic effects of two major immigration policies aimed at legalizing undocumented individuals that entered the United States as children and completed high school: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the DREAM Act. The former offers only temporary legal status to eligible individuals, whereas the latter provides a track to legal permanent residence. Our analysis is based on a general equilibrium model that allows for shifts in participation between work, college, and non-employment. The model is calibrated to account for productivity differences across workers of different skills and documentation status, and a rich pattern of complementarities across different types of workers. We estimate that DACA increased gross domestic product (GDP) by almost 0.02% (about $3.5 billion), or $7,454 per legalized worker. Passing the DREAM Act would increase GDP by around 0.08% (or $15.2 billion), which amounts to an average of $15,371 for each legalized worker. The larger effects of the DREAM Act stem from the expected larger take-up and the increased incentive to attend college among DREAMers with a high school degree. We also find substantial wage increases for individuals obtaining legal status, particularly those that increase their educational attainment. Because of the small size of the DREAMer population, and their skill distribution, legalization entails negligible effects on the wages of US-born workers. which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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“…Moreover, wages offered to undocumented immigrants will be discounted by the expected fine employers may have to pay if these employers are caught employing undocumented workers. Fourth, the three previous mechanisms imply that obtaining legal status increases immigrants' bargaining power -given that they enjoy higher occupational mobility, better outside options and no fear of being deported -and reduces the scope for employers to exert monopsonistic power in setting wages and working conditions (Rivera-Batiz (1999), Hotchkiss & Quispe-Agnoli (2009)). …”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Empirical Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the Role of Immigrants’ Legal Status: Evidence from Policy Experiments

Fasani¹

2015

CESifo Economic Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Programs aimed at reducing the presence of unauthorised immigrants are often at the core of the migration policy debate in host countries. In recent years, a growing body of empirical literature has attempted to understand the effect of lacking legal status on immigrants' outcomes and behaviour. The main difficulties in this field are the scarcity of data and the identification challenge posed by endogenous selection into legal status. The vast majority of these articles have therefore used amnesty programs (or similar policy changes) to establish causal relationships. In this paper, we propose a first systematic review of the empirical literature for the US and Europe on the impact of legal status on different immigrants' outcomes. We then present some new evidence of the relationship between labour market outcomes and legal status in the Italian context. In our empirical analysis, we first provide some descriptive evidence on differences in the outcomes for groups with different residence statuses, and we then exploit a specific amnesty programme to produce causal estimates of the impact of legal status. Our results confirm previous findings in the literature and show that the design of the specific amnesty analysed matters in shaping its effects. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: F22, J61, K37

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Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers

Cited by 29 publications

References 47 publications

The elasticity of labor supply to the firm over the business cycle

The elasticity of labor supply to the firm over the business cycle

The Economic Effects of Providing Legal Status to DREAMers

Understanding the Role of Immigrants’ Legal Status: Evidence from Policy Experiments

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