Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Stock‐price Informativeness

Abstract

This study examines the impact of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on stock‐price informativeness in Chinese stock markets. Its findings indicate that firms implementing ESOPs experienced an average 11.89 percent increase in stock‐price informativeness. The plans improved stock‐price informativeness through increased external attention and supervision. An event study shows that ESOPs gave rise to an announcement effect, driven by anticipated performance improvements and the novelty associated with ESOPs. A mechanism analysis demonstrates that the implementation of ESOPs attracted market attention, and the increased market supervision resulting from this mitigated the moral hazards of management associated with ESOPs. Plans with more positive signals exerted a greater influence. Notably, ESOPs that prioritized management incentives gained more recognition in the market. As the incentive effects of ESOPs were weaker than those of equity incentive plans and the ESOPs lost novelty over time, the annual announcement effect diminished gradually. These findings underscore the necessity of strengthening ESOP incentives for continued optimization of price efficiency.