This paper examines the influence of populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) on the democratic quality in Europe. We build on both, theoretical work and qualitative evaluations on the influence of populism on democratic quality. We follow Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser's (2012) distinction between populism in government and populism in opposition. We expect populism in opposition to function as a corrective. That is to say, it acts as a "drunken guest" who blurts out painful truths (e. g. issues which are ignored by other parties or shortcomings of policy outputs). In government, however, it is likely to harm democratic quality since it does not respect the rules of public contestation (e. g. undermining the legitimacy of democratic institutions). Furthermore, we contend that the effect's size is moderated by the level of consolidation, and in the case of PRRPs in government, by the specific type of government.Our empirical tests reveal evidence for the effects of PRRPs in government. We further demonstrate the moderating influence of the cabinet type, adding to the existing literature by offering a comparative, large-n study and testing qualitative derived theory in a cross country setting.