Empirically and Institutionally Rich Legal and Moral Philosophy

Cranor, Carl F.

doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00015

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…To refrain even from weighing up the risks from the activity against the costs of regulation because that we are less than 95% confident that the threat of harm is real would seem positively irresponsible (Hughes, 2003;ShraderFrechette, 1991). The idea that regulatory standards of evidence should differ from those of pure science is sometimes likened to the law's requirement for different standards of evidence in civil and criminal cases because of the different significance of false positives and false negatives in each case (Cranor, 1999).…”

Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

How Not to Criticize the Precautionary Principle

Hughes

2006

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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The precautionary principle has its origins in debates about environmental policy, but is increasingly invoked in bioethical contexts. John Harris and Søren Holm argue that the principle should be rejected as incoherent, irrational, and representing a fundamental threat to scientific advance and technological progress. This article argues that while there are problems with standard formulations of the principle, Harris and Holm's rejection of all its forms is mistaken. In particular, they focus on strong versions of the principle and fail to recognize that weaker forms, which may escape their criticisms, are both possible and advocated in the literature.

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Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

How Not to Criticize the Precautionary Principle

Hughes

2006

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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“…It accepts the philosophical apparatus offered by Dworkin and others and does not seek to build upon or critique the concepts found in this work. Its use of philosophy is applied, designed to advance policy debates, in way that may be characterized as 'institutionally sensitive' (Cranor 2007) (Cranor 1999). It is meant to offer alternative guidance to regulators and policy makers that may be overlooked because of the dominance of economic approaches in the making of regulation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

Linarelli

2018

Regulation & Governance

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This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

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We Already Have Risk Management — Do We Really Need the Precautionary Principle?

Randall

2009

IRERE

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Empirically and Institutionally Rich Legal and Moral Philosophy

Cited by 3 publications

References 7 publications

How Not to Criticize the Precautionary Principle

How Not to Criticize the Precautionary Principle

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

We Already Have Risk Management — Do We Really Need the Precautionary Principle?

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