Empirical evidence that the social relations of production matter: the case of the ante-bellum US South

Nilsson, Eric A.

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035273

“…3 An earlier empirical literature argued that some neoclassical theories are nested in larger metatheories that include social and institutional variables not included in neoclassical theory (e.g., Weisskopf, Bowles, and Gordon 1983;Nilsson 1994a). 4 An alternative way of testing two nonnested theories is to artificially nest both in a single model and then perform a pair of F-tests on each set of variables.…”

Section: / Eric a Nilssonmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Growth of Union Decertification: A Test of Two Nonnested Theories

Nilsson

¹

1997

Industrial Relations

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“…Likewise, the centuries-long persistence of institutional differences among Western Hemisphere economies documented in Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) may be explained in part by the fact that trade allowed specialization in "plantation goods" such as sugar and cotton in some countries and "family farm" goods such as tobacco and wheat in others. Richard Freeman (2000) and Chiaki These cases of divergence notwithstanding, the impact of the U.S. civil war studied by Nilsson (1994) is a reminder that cultural-institutional convergence does appear to be a powerful tendency in integrated global systems. But, like the convergence of European political institutions to the national state model over the half millennium prior to the First World War…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Raw rubber is an opaque good, rice is transparent. Another example is Eric Nilsson's (1994) study of the effects on comparative advantage and specialization resulting from the emancipation of slaves at the time of the U.S. Civil War. Cotton, according to Nilsson, was a "slave commodity" for which effort levels beyond that which could be coerced from the worker were of little importance.…”

Section: Goods Preferences and Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity

Belloc

¹

,

Bowles

²

2011

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Cultural and institutional differences among nations may result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and thus be the basis of specialization and comparative advantage, as long as these differences are not eliminated by trade. We provide an evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and institutions under autarchy, trade and factor mobility in which multiple asymptotically stable cultural-institutional conventions may exist, among which transitions may occur as a result of decentralized and un-coordinated actions of employers or employees. We show that: i) specialization and trade may arise and enhance welfare even when the countries are identical other than their cultural-institutional equilibria; ii) trade liberalization does not lead to convergence, it reinforces the cultural-institutional differences upon which comparative advantage is based and may thus impede even Pareto-improving cultural-institutional transitions; and iii) by contrast, greater mobility of factors of production favors decentralized transitions to a superior cultural-institutional convention by reducing the minimum number of cultural or institutional innovators necessary to induce a transition. JEL CODES: D23, F15, F16, C73

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“…These cases of divergence notwithstanding, the impact of the U.S. civil war studied by Nilsson (1994) is a reminder that cultural-institutional convergence does appear to be a powerful tendency in integrated global systems. But, like the convergence of European political institutions to the national state model over the half millennium prior to the First World War…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity

Belloc¹,

Bowles

²

2009

SSRN Journal

34

0

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Cultural and institutional differences among nations may result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and thus be the basis of specialization and comparative advantage, as long as these differences are not eliminated by trade. We provide an evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and institutions under autarchy, trade and factor mobility in which multiple asymptotically stable cultural-institutional conventions may exist, among which transitions may occur as a result of decentralized and un-coordinated actions of employers or employees. We show that: i) specialization and trade may arise and enhance welfare even when the countries are identical other than their cultural-institutional equilibria; ii) trade liberalization does not lead to convergence, it reinforces the cultural-institutional differences upon which comparative advantage is based and may thus impede even Pareto-improving cultural-institutional transitions; and iii) by contrast, greater mobility of factors of production favors decentralized transitions to a superior cultural-institutional convention by reducing the minimum number of cultural or institutional innovators necessary to induce a transition.

show abstract

Empirical evidence that the social relations of production matter: the case of the ante-bellum US South

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

The Growth of Union Decertification: A Test of Two Nonnested Theories

The Growth of Union Decertification: A Test of Two Nonnested Theories

International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity

International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity

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