Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other

Taipale, Joona

doi:10.1007/s10746-015-9365-1

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Something like this is what phenomenologists seem to have in mind when they speak of the irreducible alterity of the Other (e.g., Levinas 1999). In other words, phenomenologists are quite explicit about the fact that another's subjectivity is simultaneously both immanent (i.e., concretely embodied in their expressive behavior) as well as transcendent (i.e., partially beyond the reach of my perceptual capacities) (Taipale 2015). This reading of DSPinformed by a hybrid account of embodied mentality-thus appears to offer a way through the Scylla of Cartesian internalism and Charybdis of behaviorism Jacob's criticism rests on.…”

Section: The Behaviorism Objectionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Direct Social Perception

Krueger

2018

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition

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Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending DSP against several objections.

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Section: The Behaviorism Objectionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Direct Social Perception

Krueger

2018

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition

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“…How humans engage with music is a particularly striking example of embodied cognition (Brown, Collins, and Duguid 1989;Leman 2008;Perlovsky 2015;Taipale 2015). Aesthetic knowing arises from our senses and does principally not depend on articulation of statements.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Re-contextualising real-life learning to a university setting

Jansson¹

2021

Teaching in Higher Education

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The topic of this paper is the relocation of a proven learning mechanism in a real-life working situation to a university setting. The aim is to discuss to what degree the types of learning generated in the original setting can survive the recontextualisation and what might be done to retain as much value as possible. The original learning situation was an aesthetic experiencechoral singing and conductingthat allowed nine senior managers to sense various relational phenomena, such as control and empowerment, multi-voice teamwork, the impact of own body, empathy, and vulnerability. The target learning domain is a university setting. The paper draws on various theories of learning. The re-contextualisation is discussed in the form of five hurdles that must be overcome. For each hurdle, a design hypothesis is proposed. The presence of an aesthetic objectthe sounding musicilluminates the crucial linkage between discipline knowledge structures and everyday practices.

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“…As several commentators (Caminada 2015;Szanto 2015;19 Vendrell Ferran (2015), however, has shown that emotions play a crucial role in Stein's accounts of empathy and communal experience. 20 For a detailed discussion of Stein's work, see the contributions to the special issue of Human Studies edited by Szanto and Moran (2015a;Taipale 2015;Vendrell Ferran 2015;Szanto 2015;Burns 2015;Caminada 2015;Jardine 2015). 21 It is important to note that feelings (Gefühle) and feeling (Fühlen) are not two distinct intentional acts.…”

Section: Evaluative Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

Thonhauser

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela's concern-based accounts and Schmid's phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features.Keywords Shared emotions . Collective emotions . Affective intentionality . Communal experience . Edith Stein The last decade has seen an emerging debate about the possibility and nature of shared or collective emotions.1 As yet, however, there has been no agreement over precisely what these labels refer to. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotions. Following a preliminary definition, which contextualizes the debate on shared emotions within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I will discuss three major approaches to shared emotions in contemporary philosophical debate. After identifying shortcomings in these approaches and summarizing the elements that need to be accounted for in a multifaceted theory of shared emotions, I will turn to Edith Stein to introduce several suggestions from early phenomenology that can improve current theorizing on shared emotions.

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Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other

Cited by 18 publications

References 26 publications

Direct Social Perception

Direct Social Perception

Re-contextualising real-life learning to a university setting

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

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