Empathic embarrassment: Situational and personal determinants of reactions to the embarrassment of another.

Abstract

Two experiments investigated the reactions of observers to actors' embarrassments. The first study manipulated the nature of the prior interaction between actor and observer (cooperative, competitive, or independent) and the observational set of the observer (empathic or nonempathic). The observers' self-reports and measures of their skin potentials indicated that an empathic set and any prior interaction generally increased their responsiveness to the actors' plight. Moreover, independent, empathic observers reported reactions that appear to be empathic embarrassment, embarrassment felt with another even though one's own social identity is not threatened. The second study showed that empathic embarrassment is strongest in subjects of high embarrassability who are chronically susceptible to embarrassment. The results portray social embarrassment as a robust, pervasive phenomenon that nevertheless affects some people more than others. The possible origins of empathic embarrassment and the joint influences of perception, interaction, and personality on the experience of empathic embarrassment are discussed. Embarrassment is that uncomfortable state of mortification, awkwardness, and chagrin that can result whenever undesired events publicly threaten one's social identity (Goffman, 1956). It is an aversive state of psychological and physiological arousal (Buck, Parke, & Buck, 1970) that engenders a sense of both exposure and abashment (Edelmann, 1985; Miller, 1986). As a result, people avoid embarrassment whenever possible (even at cost to themselves; e.g., Brown, 1970) and quickly try to repair its damage whenever it does occur (Apsler, 1975; Modigliani, 1971). Thus embarrassment can have substantial influence on social interaction. Nevertheless, the phenomenon has received relatively little experimental attention. Moreover, several intriguing determinants of embarrassment have largely been ignored by prior studies. How do the observers who witness others' embarrassments respond? Are there meaningful individual differences in susceptibility to embarrassment? This article reports two studies that address these questions and demonstrate the existence of an empathic embarrassment that depends heavily on both interactive and personality influences. Embarrassing Circumstances Scientific study of embarrassment began with Goffman's (1956) seminal suggestion that embarrassment results from disrupted interaction in which a person fails to maintain a consis-My thanks go to Sandy Standard, Barry Blackwood, Debbie Curtin, Martin Fleet, Cyd Strauss, and Karen Wollman for their help in conducting these studies. I am also grateful for the helpful suggestions provided by John Kihlstrom, Mark Leary, Barry Schlenker, and two anonymous reviewers.

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