Emotions and Behavior Regulation in Decision Dilemmas

Gómez‐Miñambres, Joaquín; Schniter, Eric

doi:10.3390/g8020022

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 128 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As we trade off the possible benefits from selfish and cooperative pursuits, we need to integrate the successes and failures of past experiences. Emotions help guide our behavior in decision dilemmas: for example, by recalibrating how much we value another's welfare (Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2016;Gómez-Miñambres & Schniter, 2017;Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2017;Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).…”

Section: Theory and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Schniter

Shields

Sznycer

2020

Journal of Economic Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a looming concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed behaviors by humans in analogous situations. We find that people invest similarly in humans and robots. By contrast, the social emotions elicited by the interactions (but not non-social emotions) differed across human and robot trust games, and did so lawfully. Emotional reactions depended on how one's trust game decision interacted with the partnered agent's decision, and whether another person was affected economically and emotionally.

show abstract

Section: Theory and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Schniter

Shields

Sznycer

2020

Journal of Economic Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We depart from standard game theory by assuming that players in the trust game might experience negative emotions from their actions (Gómez‐Miñambres and Schniter 2017a; 2017b). We consider two types of emotions.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment Choice Architecture in Trust Games: When “All‐in” Is Not Enough

2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While many economic interactions feature "All-or-Nothing" options nudging investors towards going "all-in", such designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor's action space in two versions of the "trust game". In one version investors can invest either "all" their endowment or "nothing". In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. Consistent with our intentions-based model, we show that "all-or-nothing" designs coax more investment but limit investors' demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, "all-in" investors are less generously reciprocated than when they can invest any amount, where full investments are a clearer signal of trustworthiness.

show abstract

“…The level of trust also has a role in deciding these ratios. If participants focus on short-sighted benefits, the opportunity to obtaining maximum gain is most paramount; if participants lay their visions ahead for long-term benefits, the pay-off can be adjusted for a trust-based relationship [28]. As a result, by using the generalised model, project managers may gain insights into the strategy adaptation, and more importantly, understand the reasons leading to aggression or co-operation.…”

Section: Application In Context Of Project Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario

Chang

Prokopenko

2017

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice.

show abstract

Emotions and Behavior Regulation in Decision Dilemmas

Cited by 6 publications

References 128 publications

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Investment Choice Architecture in Trust Games: When “All‐in” Is Not Enough

Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About