Abstract:This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory e… Show more
“…I do not think that emotion is well described as a kind of abduction, as it involves an extremely complex process that combines cognitive appraisal of a situation with respect to ones goals and perception of bodily states [43,42]. At best, abductive inference is only a part of the broader parallel process of emotional reactions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the Thagard and Stewart [46] account of creativity also applies to emotions, which can also be understood as patterns of activity in neural populations involving multiple brain areas involved in both cognitive appraisal and physiological perception [43]. In particular, the wonderful AHA!…”
Section: Generating New Ideasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many philosophers and scientists have suggested that consciousness requires representation of representation (for references see [43]), but mental models seem to require several layers: representation of representation of representation. The conscious experience of an answer to a problem comes about because of activity in top-level neural populations that encode activity of medium-level modeling populations, that encode activity of low-level populations, that topographically represent features of the world.…”
Abstract. Many psychologists, philosophers, and computer scientist have written about mental models, but have remained vague about the nature of such models. Do they consist of propositions, concepts, rules, images, or some other kind of mental representation? This paper will argue that a unified account can be achieved by understanding mental models as representations consisting of patterns of activation in populations of neurons. The fertility of this account will be illustrated by showing its applicability to causal reasoning and the generation of novel concepts in scientific discovery and technological innovation. I will also discuss the implications of this view of mental models for evaluating claims that cognition is embodied.
“…I do not think that emotion is well described as a kind of abduction, as it involves an extremely complex process that combines cognitive appraisal of a situation with respect to ones goals and perception of bodily states [43,42]. At best, abductive inference is only a part of the broader parallel process of emotional reactions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the Thagard and Stewart [46] account of creativity also applies to emotions, which can also be understood as patterns of activity in neural populations involving multiple brain areas involved in both cognitive appraisal and physiological perception [43]. In particular, the wonderful AHA!…”
Section: Generating New Ideasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many philosophers and scientists have suggested that consciousness requires representation of representation (for references see [43]), but mental models seem to require several layers: representation of representation of representation. The conscious experience of an answer to a problem comes about because of activity in top-level neural populations that encode activity of medium-level modeling populations, that encode activity of low-level populations, that topographically represent features of the world.…”
Abstract. Many psychologists, philosophers, and computer scientist have written about mental models, but have remained vague about the nature of such models. Do they consist of propositions, concepts, rules, images, or some other kind of mental representation? This paper will argue that a unified account can be achieved by understanding mental models as representations consisting of patterns of activation in populations of neurons. The fertility of this account will be illustrated by showing its applicability to causal reasoning and the generation of novel concepts in scientific discovery and technological innovation. I will also discuss the implications of this view of mental models for evaluating claims that cognition is embodied.
“…Current emotion theories tend to divide into two camps, one that considers emotions to be akin to judgments [20], and the other that considers emotions to be reactions to bodily states [21]. This division, however, can be reconciled by considering the brain as reacting to situations in ways that take into account both cognitive appraisal of situations and perception of bodily states, as in the EMOCON model of Thagard and Aubie [22,23]. A simplified version of this model, omitting neural details, is shown in Fig.…”
Model-based reasoning requires not only inferences about what is happening, but also evaluations of the desirability of what is happening. Emotions are a key part of such assessments, but sometimes they can lead people astray, as in motivated inference when people believe what fits with their desires. In contrast to motivated inference, fear-driven inference generates beliefs that people do not want to be true. Although paradoxical, this kind of inference is common in many domains, including romantic relationships, health, parenting, politics, and economics. This paper proposes that fear-driven inference results from gut overreactions, in which a feeling that something is wrong is erroneously taken as evidence that something really is wrong. We discuss psychological and neural mechanisms by which gut overreactions can lead to fear-driven inference, and show how a computer model of emotional coherence can explain both fear-driven and motivated inference.
“…At the psychological level, we can understand confidence as not simply a cognitive phenomenon such as subjective probability, but as also an emotional phenomenon that involves the brain's perception of physiological changes as well as cognitive appraisal of the relevance of a situation to a person's goals (for defense of this account of emotion, see Aubie 2008 and. Emotional overreactions to good developments can lead to what Shiller (2005) called irrational exuberance, and overreactions to bad developments can lead to irrational despair.…”
This paper uses the economic crisis of 2008 as a case study to examine the explanatory validity of collective mental representations. Distinguished economists such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz attribute collective beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions to organizations such as banks and governments. I argue that the most plausible interpretation of these attributions is that they are metaphorical pointers to a complex of multilevel social, psychological, and neural mechanisms. This interpretation also applies to collective knowledge in science: scientific communities do not literally have collective representations, but social mechanisms do make important contributions to scientific knowledge.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.