436Reading a passage from a favorite novel makes it clear that language evokes emotion. In addition, empirical studies have shown that emotions that are evoked by language can be powerful (Velten, 1968) and can have an impact on judgments (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Nonetheless, the interaction between emotion and language is not well understood. Oatley (1994) suggests that since Aristotle, one explanation is based on the notion of simulation. We briefly review recent theory, data, and methods investigating simulation in language comprehension and in social cognition before introducing a new method to study the relation between emotion and language comprehension. In this article, we present initial evidence consistent with (1) a simulation account, and (2) the idea that the effect of emotion on language comprehension is likely to result from processes other than initial lexical access.By "simulation during language comprehension," we mean that a neural process ordinarily having a nonlinguistic function (e.g., action, perception, emotion) is also used during language comprehension. In addition, the simulation may be functional in that it plays a causal role in language comprehension. As we will review shortly, the case for functional simulation is strongest in the domains of action and perception. The evidence that we present for simulation using emotion is only initial; that is, the functional role has yet to be secured.The case for simulation of action during language comprehension is very strong because of converging evidence from behavioral, physiological, and neuroscience techniques. Glenberg and Kaschak (2002; see also Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) demonstrated a relation between action and language comprehension by using behavioral methods. Participants read sentences describing action away from the body (e.g., You handed Courtney the notebook) or toward the body (Courtney handed you the notebook) and judged whether the sentences were sensible. Participants responded "sensible" by reaching toward a button far from the body in one condition and toward the body in the other condition. Participants were faster to make "sensible" judgments when the action that was implied by the sentence (e.g., away from the body) was compatible with the action required to make the response. These data support the claim that language comprehension involves simulation grounded in neural systems for action. Using fMRI, Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) demonstrated that the motor and premotor cortex are activated in a somatotopic fashion while silently reading action verbs, such as kick, pick, and lick. That is, in addition to activation in traditional language areas, understanding the word kick initiated activation in areas of the motor and premotor cortex that control the leg, whereas understanding the word pick initiated activation in areas that control the hand, and so on. Evidence consistent with the claim that the simulation is functional comes from the use of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Thus, Buccino et al. (2...