Emotion and Cognition: Feeling and Character Identification in Dreaming

Kahn, David; Pace‐Schott, Edward F.; Hobson, J. Allan

doi:10.1006/ccog.2001.0537

Cited by 59 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…A crucial part of that project is comparing metacognitive function in different modes of waking, sleeping and dreaming. Bizarre experiences of misidentification occur in dreams (Revonsuo and Salmivalli, 1995; Röhrenbach and Landis, 1995; Kahn et al, 2002; Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002; Schwartz and Maquet, 2002; Desseilles et al, 2011). Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) analyzed 592 dream reports that contained bizarre dream characters (people who appear in dreams).…”

Section: Hyper- and Hypofamiliaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu

Gerrans

2014

Front. Psychol.

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The ability to challenge and revise thoughts prompted by anomalous experiences depends on activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal circuitry. When activity in those circuits is absent or compromised subjects are less likely to make this kind of correction. This appears to be the cause of some delusions of misidentification consequent on experiences of hyperfamiliarity for faces. Comparing the way the mind responds to the experience of hyperfamiliarity in different conditions such as delusions, dreams, pathological and non-pathological déjà vu, provides a way to understand claims that delusions and dreams are both states characterized by deficient “reality testing.”

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Section: Hyper- and Hypofamiliaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu

Gerrans

2014

Front. Psychol.

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“…Of course 'real' memory fragments can also appear in the dream, but a new narrative, a new context will provide the guideline for the dream. Neuroimaging studies (MAQUET et al 2000) and phenomenological investigations of the content and structure of dreams (HARTMANN 1996;KAHN et al 2002) suggest that in the hyperassociative quasi-chaos of dreaming, emotions can be the main organizers. Accordingly, the core emotional concerns of the dreamer, conscious and unconscious affective patterns, can be the deep structure of the dream (NIELSEN & STENSTROM 2005).…”

Section: Dream Images and Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dreaming and health promotion: A theoretical proposal and some epidemiological establishments

Bódizs¹,

Simor²,

Csóka³

et al. 2008

European Journal of Mental Health

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Both neurobiological and cognitive psychological evidence suggests that dreams reflect the affective concerns and emotional balance of the dreamer. Moreover, there is increasing evidence for the thesis that dreams take part in the process of emotional regulation by creating narrative structures and new associations for memories with emotional and personal relevance and giving birth to a reduced emotional arousal or balanced mood state during post-dreaming wakefulness. As health means a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, it is reasonable to assume that it is reflected in the quality of dream experiences. These theoretical considerations are exemplified by significant associations between dream emotions and health indexes emerging after the preliminary analysis of the Hungarostudy epidemiological database. Results suggest that items of the Dream Quality Questionnaire correlate with self-rated health, days spent on sick leave and most prominently with well-being. Negative dream emotions are negative predictors of health, while the opposite is true for positive ones. This effect is only partially explained by the illness intrusiveness index, the effect of dreams on daytime mood or well-being as measured by the well-being scale of the World Health Organization (WHO). Our results indicate that simple practical questions regarding habitual dream-affect, nightmares and nightterror-like symptoms convey information on the general mental and physical health of the subjects, which could be useful in medical practice.

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“…These are typically experienced as being highly realistic and clearly distinct from the self. Social interactions are actually even more frequent in dream reports than in randomly timed waking reports (McNamara et al, 2005) and are often experienced as emotionally engaging (Kahn et al, 2002). In particular, non-self dream characters are often experienced as having a mind of their own, with dream reports frequently describing cases in which the dreamer engages in theory-of-mind attributions by ascribing emotions, beliefs and desires to other dream characters (McNamara et al, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tickle me, I think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and predictive processing in lucid dreams

Windt

Harkness

Lenggenhager

2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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The contrast between self- and other-produced tickles, as a special case of sensory attenuation for self-produced actions, has long been a target of empirical research. While in standard wake states it is nearly impossible to tickle oneself, there are interesting exceptions. Notably, participants awakened from REM (rapid eye movement-) sleep dreams are able to tickle themselves. So far, however, the question of whether it is possible to tickle oneself and be tickled by another in the dream state has not been investigated empirically or addressed from a theoretical perspective. Here, we report the results of an explorative web-based study in which participants were asked to rate their sensations during self-tickling and being tickled during wakefulness, imagination, and lucid dreaming. Our results, though highly preliminary, indicate that in the special case of lucid control dreams, the difference between self-tickling and being tickled by another is obliterated, with both self- and other produced tickles receiving similar ratings as self-tickling during wakefulness. This leads us to the speculative conclusion that in lucid control dreams, sensory attenuation for self-produced tickles spreads to those produced by non-self dream characters. These preliminary results provide the backdrop for a more general theoretical and metatheoretical discussion of tickling in lucid dreams in a predictive processing framework. We argue that the primary value of our study lies not so much in our results, which are subject to important limitations, but rather in the fact that they enable a new theoretical perspective on the relationship between sensory attenuation, the self-other distinction and agency, as well as suggest new questions for future research. In particular, the example of tickling during lucid dreaming raises the question of whether sensory attenuation and the self-other distinction can be simulated largely independently of external sensory input.

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Emotion and Cognition: Feeling and Character Identification in Dreaming

Cited by 59 publications

References 32 publications

Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu

Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu

Dreaming and health promotion: A theoretical proposal and some epidemiological establishments

Tickle me, I think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and predictive processing in lucid dreams

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