Emissions trading systems with cap adjustments

Kollenberg, Sascha; Taschini, Luca

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.003

Cited by 77 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The second is the carbon price, p. Weitzman (1974) and Roberts and Spence (1976) have argued that when carbon emissions demand is uncertain, and the marginal benefit function related to the global benefit from GHG mitigation is (much) more stable than the marginal cost function in the short run (for society, for implementing a given mitigation policy), the carbon price should be kept stable, and emissions variable, in the short or intermediate run (5-10 years, or longer). Most of the literature, including Pizer (2002), Kollenberg and Taschini (2016), Abrell and Rausch 2017, and Weitzman (2017), tends to concur. The global marginal cost of carbon emissions (the "global cost of carbon") is relatively stable in the short and medium run, as it depends largely on long-run global economic development and growth conditions which change little in the short run.…”

Section: Digression: Impacts Of Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 98%

Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance “Blending” as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement

Strand¹

2019

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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Section: Digression: Impacts Of Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 98%

Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance “Blending” as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement

Strand¹

2019

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“…Some researchers focused on how to formulate or adjust cap-and-trade policy including determining the allocation of permits and trading price. Kollenberg and Taschini proposed a method which changes the allocation of permits based on the current bank of permits which figured out firms' emissions control problem [15]. Jiang et al found that generally the social optimum will not be touched in the cap-and-trade system, if the emission allocation of enterprises is lower than the optimal level.…”

Section: Supply Chain Operation Decisions Under Cap-and-trade Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

Jiang

2019

Sustainability

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Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

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“…While the empirical literature on this subject is quite extensive, the theoretical literature is relatively scarce. Indeed, most of the theoretical works on ETSs deal with the optimal number of allowances to be allocated on the market and on the related carbon prices (see, e.g., Grüll & Taschini, ; Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern & Palmer, ; Kollenberg & Taschini, ; Perino & Willner, ). Several other studies (see, among others, Malueg, ; Milliman & Prince, ; Jung, Krutilla & Boyd, ; Unold & Requate, ; Requate, ) have focused on aggregate cost‐savings deriving from the adoption of new technologies in cap‐and‐trade systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emission permits and the dynamics of clean and dirty firms in an evolutionary competition model

et al. 2019

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Emission Trading Systems (ETSs) are today regarded as the pillar of market-based environmental policies in many countries. This paper studies the impact of an ETS on the dynamics of the market made up of two types of firms: clean and dirty. Using an evolutionary context, we study how the share of clean firms evolves at different parameter values, such as increasing values of the permits' price floor, and show that an ETS can have positive effects on the diffusion of the clean technology. However, numerical simulations show that under specific parameter values the opposite result may emerge with clean firms leaving the market.

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Emissions trading systems with cap adjustments

Cited by 77 publications

References 23 publications

Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance “Blending” as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement

Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance “Blending” as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement

Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

Emission permits and the dynamics of clean and dirty firms in an evolutionary competition model

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