Emission Reduction Technology Licensing and Diffusion Under Command-and-Control Regulation

Xia, Haiyang; Fan, Tijun; Chang, Xiangyun

doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0201-0

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The literature addressing green technology licensing includes only a few papers: Kim et al (2014Kim et al ( , 2017, Hattori (2017), Xia et al (2019), andLi (2021). Kim et al (2014) examine the welfare consequences of an innovator's green licensing strategy with an emissions tax.…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hattori (2017) examines the optimum trade-off between innovation and environmental policy in the context of technology licensing. Xia et al (2019) examine the effect of command and control regulation on the licensing and spread of emission abatement technology in an oligopolistic market. Li (2021) studies green technology licensing strategy in a mixed oligopoly with an inside innovator.…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Shang

2021

Preprint

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This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate a firm’s green technology licensing strategy with corporate social responsibility (CSR). In our model, licensing is conducted by an inside innovator and the patent holder may take CSR activities under a time-consistent emission tax. The result shows that fixed-fee licensing is always the optimal strategy of the patent holder when there is no CSR. In the CSR case, when the reduction degree of abatement cost coefficient is large, the optimal licensing strategy of the patent holder changes from pure royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing as the degree of CSR decreases. Furthermore, we find that neither conflict nor consistency always exists between social welfare and firm payoff goals. When the degree of CSR is relatively low, fixed-fee licensing is preferred both by the patent holder and the government. Otherwise, when the degree of CSR is relatively high, the government prefers fixed-fee licensing, while the patent holder prefers royalty licensing. Finally, we analyze the effects of CSR behaviors on environment and social welfare. We show that CSR is beneficial for environment, while it is not always beneficial for social welfare.JEL Classifications: D42; M14; I13

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Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Shang

2021

Preprint

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“…The majority of current scholarly studies concentrate on the interactions between governments and corporations. As an example, Xia et al [ 28 ] created a non-cooperative game model to examine the effects of strict environmental regulations on companies' emissions reduction technologies. In addition, Zhenling and Wenju [ 29 ] formulated a game model that included local governments and enterprises to study a workable environmental taxation system during a transition from a fee-based to a tax-based approach.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a green mining future: A dynamic evolutionary game model for collaborative waste recycling

Zhou,

Xin,

Han

2023

Heliyon

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“…Hattori (2017) explored the ideal trade-off between environmental policies and innovations when it comes to technology licensing. Xia et al (2019) evaluated command-and-control regulation's influence on green technology licensing. Moreover, in a mixed oligopoly, Li (2021) investigated the licensing options for green innovations.…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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This study investigates the green technology licensing strategies of firms with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly market. The results show that in the absence of CSR, the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing for a patent holding firm. In the precent of CSR, the optimal licensing contract for a patent holding firm switches from fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing with increasing level of CSR if the reduction cost of emissions is high. Moreover, we show that the profit goal of firm and the social welfare goal of government are not always mutually exclusive. If the level of CSR is low, a uniform licensing contract would be preferable. If the level of CSR is high, the optimal licensing contract is inconsistent. Finally, we show that CSR is not always beneficial to the social welfare while CSR benefits the environment. Social welfare benefits from increased CSR degree, but vice versa is true when CSR degree decreases. This research may provide valuable insights into licensing and CSR literature.

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Emission Reduction Technology Licensing and Diffusion Under Command-and-Control Regulation

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Towards a green mining future: A dynamic evolutionary game model for collaborative waste recycling

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

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