Emission abatement and procurement strategies in a low-carbon supply chain with option contracts under stochastic demand

The main body of competition has changed from the competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains. The cooperation of the chain-to-chain attracts large attention from entrepreneurs and scholars in an increasingly competitive environment. Thus, this paper studies a chain-to-chain system with price competition consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation. Considering vertical-horizontal cooperation, the six different models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (adopting the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. Based on the Stackelbeg game and Nash game, the optimal solutions of six models are obtained. The results show that the decisions, profits, and social welfare of the supply chains are affected by the structural cooperation than the contractual cooperation. The asymmetric competition structure changes the bargaining power of the supply chains. The relationship of supply chains' pricing only is affected by the cooperation structures. The relationship of the cap setting, profits, and social welfare are affected by the cooperation structures and the main decision parameters.

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“…As revenue sharing contract, cost sharing contract and wholesale price contract etc. are widely adopted in academic researchers [13,17,18,21,35].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Shang

Qin

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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“…Different consumers have different types of preferences for products, which is an essential factor affecting product sale [1,44]. Therefore, some consumers are more environmentally conscious and prefer environmentally friendly products when choosing products, such as low-carbon product [8,41,62] and remanufactured product [7,62,64]. Besides, consumer preference will also make a difference to enterprise profits and the supply chain operation efficiency [14].…”

Section: Consumer Preference In a Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which group should governmental policies target? Effects of incentive policy for remanufacturing industry

et al. 2021

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Although previous research ignores other subsidy groups, we conduct a comprehensive study. In our closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model, the manufacturer can produce either new products or remanufactured products of end-of-life (EOL) products recycled by independent recyclers. Our core objective is to explore the pricing strategies of the two products under different government subsidy plans and which groups the government subsidy plans should target. Considering the consumers' discount perception and uncertainty of recovery rate, we construct four game models: (1) no subsidy (Scenario N); (2) subsidy for the manufacturer (Scenario M); (3) subsidy fof the four models. We also compare the profits and social welfare in these four models and find that the Scenario C has the most significant improvement in enterprise profits and social welfare compared to other models. r the recycler (Scenario R); (4) subsidy for consumers (Scenario C). We first obtain the equilibrium strategies oFinally, in scenario C , when consumers' discount perception increases, the quantity of new products first rises then falls, and the quantity of remanufactured is on the contrary.

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“…Mathematical Problems in Engineering en, let formula (19) obtain the first-order derivative for β j1 and β j2 , and make the first derivative equal to 0, and the optimal excitation functions are obtained, respectively:…”

Section: Incentive Contract Under Unfair Disadvantagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Qiu et al [16,17] studied the issue of carbon tax incentive policies for airline passenger transportation, and the research showed that the government promotes airlines to improve fuel consumption and emission performance through competitive tax rebates. In addition, some scholars have analyzed the role of low-carbon technology subsidies in promoting technology research of companies based on the perspective of supply chain [3,4,18,19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks

Zhu

Cao

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Considering the multitargets of corporate carbon emission reduction and the fairness preference psychology of the company, a government incentive model for corporate carbon emission reduction was constructed. The impact of corporate fairness preferences on government carbon emission reduction incentive strategies is studied. In addition, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of changes in correlation coefficients, fairness preference coefficients, and discount rates on the optimal enterprise effort coefficient and the government optimal incentive coefficient. Research shows that the degree of fairness preference of a company has a direct impact on the degree of corporate effort, while the discount rate will only have an impact on the company’s long-term effort. In order to improve corporate carbon emission reduction efforts, the government must not only consider the impact of fairness preference on corporate efforts but also flexibly adjust the incentive coefficient of long-term and short-term tasks based on the discount rate.

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Emission abatement and procurement strategies in a low-carbon supply chain with option contracts under stochastic demand

Cited by 75 publications

References 55 publications

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Which group should governmental policies target? Effects of incentive policy for remanufacturing industry

Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks

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