Emergence: selection, allowed operations, and conserved quantities

Abstract

We treat emergence via reference to four ideas: (1) the different levels of emergence are characterised by distinct conservation laws, (2) the emergence process starts from some instability, (3) the driving force of emergence is given by selection processes allowing canalisation of specific (emerging) paths, and (4) new forms of stability are determined by new kinds of operations. At a quantum-mechanical level entropy is conserved in an isolated system or at global level and the only allowed operations are local shifts in order and disorder − that implies weakening and strengthening correlations. The stable state is here represented by a highly symmetric state. Emergence of the classical physical world arises when energy is conserved and allowable operations include building and breaking of physicalchemical connections. The stable state is here the energy minimum. Emergence of the biotic world implies that the conserved quantity is energy efficiency. Energy is no longer locally conserved. The allowed operations are those that are consistent with the survival (persistence) of the organism. The emergence of the mind is grounded in selecting those operations that are rational (in the sense of maintaining biological self-organisation). Here, the rational value of behaviour is the quantity of interest. Mounting the ladder of (both cosmic and biological) evolution means to have more and more selection of the possible outcomes (and therefore of the relative operations) but in a growing space of possibilities: if selection would reduce more and more the space of possibilities, the final result would be a rigid order; at the other extreme, if we had only expansion of the possibilities without selection, the final result would be disorder. So growing complexity can be understood as a path in the evolutionary landscape of the systems in which a balance of order and disorder is maintained although each level emerges as a result of the selection.

Critical Examination of Peirce’s Theory of Categories

“…It is true that in fact, in most situations, these two aspects are intertwined, so that Peirce's view is in a sense understandable. However, they need to be conceptually distinguished, and to say that this process is determined in advance by some kind of finality is to put things upside down (Auletta, 2015). In fact, the crucial notion of habit-forming should precisely set things in the correct way by establishing teleology as something arising (in the course of evolutionary processes) from, so to say, below and not pre-ordered from above.…”