Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind

Rupert, Robert D.

doi:10.5840/philtopics201139116

Cited by 22 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…One approach is simply to stipulate that covariance of a certain kind constitutes content (e.g. Rupert 2011). This entails deflating the notion of content so that all we mean by content is such a relation.…”

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Silverman

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory's associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to 'knowledge' means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role ascribed to knowledge by the theory, but argues that this knowledge can and should be identified with bodily skill rather than representation. Making the further argument that the notion of 'representation hunger' can be replaced with 'prima facie representation hunger', it concludes that although the theory could optionally be developed scientifically in part by reference to internal representation, it makes a strong and natural fit with anti-representationalist embodied or enactive cognitive science.

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Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Silverman

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…I maintain that the strength of various associations, the impact of particular model-free policies and model-based goals, and the inhibitory and excitatory relations between multiple systems are crucial variables that ought to be taken into account in developing a mechanistic account of how implicit biases are produced (cf., Rupert 2011). In light of this fact, we should expect low betweenmeasure correlations for different ways of examining implicit bias.…”

Section: A Plausible Architecture For Implicit Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition

Huebner¹

2016

Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1

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Recent data from the cognitive and behavioral sciences suggest that irrelevant features of our environment can often play a role in shaping our morally significant decisions. This isn't always a bad thing. But our inability to suppress or moderate our reflexive reactions can lead us to behave in ways that diverge from our reflectively held ideals, and to pursue worse options while knowing there are better ones available (Spinoza 2002, 320). Nowhere is this clearer than it is where racial biases persist in those who have adopted egalitarian ideals. My primary aim in this paper is to sketch a computational framework of implicit biases, which can explain both their emergence and their stability in the face of egalitarian ideals; I then use this framework to explain why some strategies for intervening on implicit biases are likely to be more successful than others. I argue that there are plausible ways to adjust our goals and manipulate our local environments to moderate the expression of implicit bias in the short-run, but I also maintain that the dynamic nature of learning and valuation, as well as the impact of stress on cognitive processing, necessitate more comprehensive interventions designed to reshape the cognitive niche we inhabit. Put bluntly, the freedom to act on what we know to be best can only arise in a world where our reflexive and reflective attitudes are, by their very nature, already aligned. So if we wish to gain control over our implicit biases, we must intervene on the world to which our attitudes are attuned, and do so in a way that instills anti-racist attitudes.

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“…It has led to impressive successes in artificial intelligence stemming from the creation of behaviour-based robots (Beer, 1998, 2000; Brooks, 1991a, 1991b). Citing these sorts of developments it has been noted by the opposition that fans of REC ‘claim that embodiment-related empirical results support sweeping, negative conclusions: that there are no amodal symbols; that there are no arbitrary symbols; that functionalism is false; that computationalism is false; and more’ (Rupert, 2011, p. 99).…”

Section: Introduction: the Rec Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exorcising action oriented representations: ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl

Hutto

2013

Adaptive Behavior

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This paper reviews two main strategies for dealing with the threat posed by radically enactive/embodied cognition to traditional cognitive science. Both strategies invoke action oriented representations (AORs). They differ in emphasizing different features of AORs in their attempt to answer the REC threat-focusing on their contents and vehicles, respectively. The first two sections review the central motivations and rationales driving the 'content' and 'format' strategies in turn and raise initial concerns about the tenability of each. With respect to the 'content' strategy, these worries ought to make us suspicious about the explanatory value of positing AORs. Although the 'format' strategy has a way of answering this concern, it raises a more fundamental worry about the motivation for even believing in AORs in the first place. Although these worries cast doubt on the feasibility of invoking AORs as a means of dealing with the REC threat, they do not constitute conclusive reasons for eliminating AORs altogether. There are other, stronger reasons for supposing that we should. The third section provides a sketch of a master argument, developed elsewhere, which makes that case in full dress fashion. The final section-'Resurrection?'-considers and rejects the possibility that AORs might be resurrected, even if it is agreed that the master argument cited in the third section succeeds.

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Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind

Cited by 22 publications

References 67 publications

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition

Exorcising action oriented representations: ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl

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