“…Along this line of reasoning, some theorists have recently proposed an embodied account of time perception (Droit‐Volet, Fayolle, Lamotte, & Gil, 2013, 2020; Wittmann, 2014), which differs from other existing models (e.g., Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990; Zakay & Block, 1997) as it claims that motor simulations and bodily states play a critical role in time judgments. In more detail, it has been argued that the conscious representation of time descends from a temporal integration of bodily feelings over time (e.g., Craig, 2009; Wackermann, Meissner, Tankersley, & Wittmann, 2014; Wittmann, 2013, 2014), including those associated with self‐generated movements (Fernandes & Garcia‐Marques, 2019).…”