Time and Body 2020
DOI: 10.1017/9781108776660.029
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Embodied Selfhood and Personal Identity in Dementia

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Cited by 24 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…A minimal self thus remains throughout the course of the disease [54][55][56]. It does, however, change what it is like to be a person with dementia throughout the course of the disease [57].…”
Section: Dementia and Narrative Identitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A minimal self thus remains throughout the course of the disease [54][55][56]. It does, however, change what it is like to be a person with dementia throughout the course of the disease [57].…”
Section: Dementia and Narrative Identitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Christian Tewes cites a patient of Thomas Fuchs who in advanced stages of dementia is still able to skillfully play football with his grandchildren [( 42 ), p. 301]. As Tewes explains, this is not automatic behavior but “situation-specific embedded action patterns that depend on attention to and implicit understanding or know-how of the respective social context” [( 43 ), p. 383]. Such skill is also strongly linked to previous life experiences even if, as in the case of dementia, these life experiences cannot be explicitly recalled by the subject.…”
Section: A 3-part Methods To This Madnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ambiguous conception of personhood in dementia is addressed by a wide range of authors (Hydén et al 2014;Kontos 2012;Summa 2014;Snyder 2006;Tewes 2021;Wray 2020). Many of them argue that personhood is constituted in social practices.…”
Section: Social and Embodied Personhood In Dementiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These different types of bodily responses will be addressed in this paper. 5 Fuchs (2020), Tewes (2021), and Kontos et al (2017) argue against rationalist Cartesian assumptions of a dualistic nature of the person that traditionally account for a separation between body and mind. In rationalist or cognitivist views, the person's body is regarded as the mere carrier of a brain, which is an organ that produces and processes only mental states.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%