Embedding Regulatory Autonomy In Caribbean Telecommunications

Abstract

This article considers the reform of telecommunications regulation in three Caribbean countries, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, as they responded to changes in the international regulatory environment and speci¢c domestic challenges. The three countries also adopted strategies to adjust their internal structures and to utilize international development aid. The article focuses on their e¡orts to establish embedded regulatory autonomy, considered along three dimensions: organizational capability, institutional design, and embeddedness within the regulatory space. Each country has taken a di¡erent approach to regulatory reform, which is re£ected in the respective outcomes. While Jamaica has made tentative progress towards regulatory autonomy, in the other countries progress has been limited. In Trinidad and Tobago, political gridlock has forestalled attempts at regulatory reform, while in Barbados the regulatory reform process has been dominated by the incumbent. The conclusion considers the challenges of establishing regulatory autonomy, particularly the process of embedding regulatory relationships.

Regulation and development: Theoretical contributions and empirical lessons from Latin America

“…As a result, one central interest has been in exploring conditions and devices that deal with the tension between commitment and "credibility" on the one hand, and "flexibility" on the other. One response has been an interest in ideas of "regulatory autonomy," a state of the world in which regulatory agencies are captured neither by state nor economic interests (Lodge & Stirton, 2002). Such state of autonomy may result from encouraging regulatory approaches that focus on "disciplined discretion."…”

“…As a result, one central interest has been in exploring conditions and devices that deal with the tension between commitment and “credibility” on the one hand, and “flexibility” on the other. One response has been an interest in ideas of “regulatory autonomy,” a state of the world in which regulatory agencies are captured neither by state nor economic interests (Lodge & Stirton, 2002). Such state of autonomy may result from encouraging regulatory approaches that focus on “disciplined discretion.” For example, Lodge et al (2017) noted how the lack of disciplined discretion in the context of Brazil's regulation of logistics infrastructures impeded sustainable development but served the short‐term interests of private and political actors alike.…”

The Dynamics of Industrial Development in a Resource-Rich Developing Society: A Political Economy Analysis

“…20 In 1986, the company engaged in infrastructure investment that resulted in important cost savings and improved service quality, yet with the country’s economic downturn and mounting debt, the company found itself in serious financial straits with its international creditors seeking repayment on loans advanced (McCormick, 1997). Toward the end of the decade, Telephone Company Limited (TELCO) was partially divested, with the government retaining 51 percent of its shares and minority partner British-owned Cable and Wireless (C&W) bought 49 percent of the shares (Lodge & Stirton, 2002). According to one source: With the advent of Cable and Wireless into the Board Room of the company, [the R&D] department was exterminated and we disbanded any sort of research function.…”

“…22.McCormick (1997) also argues that telecoms liberalization in T&T also led to an undemocratic process where citizens were debarred from participating in share purchases while Lodge and Stirton (2002) show a worsening pattern of regulatory practice in T&T where liberalization has borne an antagonistic relations between competing interests.…”

Regulatory policy choice in post‐reform contexts: The case of industrial safety regulation in Mexico's oil and gas industry

“…For Latin American countries, the study of the effect of development on the regulatory process has been explained as a function of the need of governments to demonstrate a credible commitment to overcoming threats to expropriate infrastructure and capital investments from domestic or international private stakeholders (Levy & Spiller, 1996). Other authors have highlighted the limited administrative capacity of states and the impact of this on their ability to ensure efficient implementation of their regulatory strategy and effective enforcement of the law, leaving the door open to corruption and regulatory capture (Estache & Wren‐Lewis, 2009; Laffont, 2005; Lodge & Stirton, 2002). Another approach to the study of how the characteristics of a developing country can affect regulatory policy design in post‐reform contexts involves analyzing how institutional and administrative legacies—and the features of a given political regime—are embedded within the regulatory policy process (Jordana, 2013; Lodge, 2003; Parrado & Salvador, 2011; Thatcher & Coen, 2008).…”