Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order

Abstract

How do institutions shape revisionist behavior in world politics? Applying a network-relational approach to revisionist states and challenges to institutional order, I conceive of institutions as networks—as patterns of ongoing social transactions in which revisionists are embedded. Revisionist behavior is shaped by how a state is positioned within this existing network of institutions. A state's position significantly influences the material and cultural resources the state can deploy in pursuit of its aims, and thus the revisionist's strategy. Focusing on two measures of network position—access and brokerage—I propose four ideal types of revisionists and their strategies in the international system: integrated revisionists, who are likely to pursue institutional engagement; bridging revisionists, who will seek rule-based revolution; isolated revisionists, who prefer to exit the institutional system; and rogue revisionists, who have few resources at hand, and thus ultimately must resort to hegemonic violence. I test these ideal types in four cases of revisionists and institutional orders: Russia in the 1820s; Prussia in the 1860s; the Soviet Union in the early Cold War; and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s.

“The persistent myth of lost hegemony,” revisited: structural power as a complex network phenomenon

“…Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006 emphasize the ways in which network prominence confers social influence that is somewhat portable across domains, and not always in ways that promote cooperation. Carpenter (2011), Carpenter et al (2015), and Goddard (2009Goddard ( , 2018 emphasize brokerage roles in transnational advocacy networks and international order revisionism, respectively. 9.…”

Russian, US and Chinese Revisionism: Bridging Domestic and Great Power Politics

“…Such export leads us to ponder how populist manoeuvring is inscribed into the concerned countries' policies in international affairs, leading us to identify what kinds of great powers qua revisionists these countries are. We ascertain these configurations inductively and with sensitivity to the specific contexts rather than on the basis of pre-established categories (Cronin 1999;Clark 2011;Goddard 2018;Cooley et al 2019). In accordance with our main theoretical/conceptual essay, 2 we understand revisionism as steps taken against a set of generally accepted and established principles related both to procedures and actual power distribution within the current global liberal order.…”

“…However different in their components and objectives, these three cases of revisionism share a central theme that can be summarised by the title of Byman and Pollack's key 2001 article, 'Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In'. Our contribution to the topic of (great power) revisionism should be understood even more broadly and in relation to the two most theoretically sophisticated works on revisionism thus far: Goddard (2018) and Cooley et al (2019). Both theorise and classify revisionist countries according to the characteristics inherent in their international position or orientation.…”

The Fate of International Monetary Systems: How and Why They Fall Apart

“…The longer unequal payoffs continue, the more member states will chafe and the more backlash their coopted monetary authorities will suffer at home. Members will eventually resist the established lines of policy, because voicing discontent should improve their leverage in negotiations, and because they are embedded in the rule-making process, so revising the rules and ideas will feel like a promising option (Goddard 2018;Hirschman 1970, 82-83). As balance-of-payment disequilibria increase, and the costs of walking out on the joint institutions propping up the system surge, members can be expected to bargain harder.…”