Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity

Abstract

We are bombarded with epistemic norms. Respect your evidence. Don’t believe in contradictions. Don’t arbitrarily change beliefs. But how do such norms get their normative force? Why should we respect our evidence, for example?  In this paper I offer a familiar type of answer, epistemic instrumentalism. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that epistemic norms get their normative force by being useful. You should respect your evidence because it will help you achieve some valuable ends. This answer, while familiar, is not very popular. There is a widely accepted objection to epistemic instrumentalism, the too few reasons objection. The objection looms so large that standard developments of instrumentalism have become bloated with philosophical machinery to respond to it. This does a disservice to epistemic instrumentalism. Rather than focusing completely on the objection, I focus on describing a simple model for how conforming to the epistemic norms is broadly useful. Once I describe the simple model, the too few reasons objection becomes much easier to answer. This strategy results in a well-motivated philosophical theory based on uncontroversial facts that has many advantages over rival theories.   

Modal Knowledge for Expressivists

“…• Topic-sensitivity: 18 A proposition is best modeled as a set of possible worlds (representing verification/truth conditions) plus a subject matter (a topic or question, or set of such things, that the proposition addresses or is about); 'a accepts p' holds only if the content of a's acceptance state is partly about p's subject matter. • Fragmentation: 19 An agent's acceptance state is best modeled as a set of propositions called frames of mind; 'a accepts p' holds just in case p is supported by at least one of a's frames of mind. Holism's appeal lies in its mathematical elegance and prediction that attitude ascriptions cohere in intuitive ways: 'Smith knows there is a black sheep' entails 'Smith knows there is a sheep', and so on.…”

“…Consider: (18) Smith believes mightp. (19) Smith doesn't believe notp. (20) Smith doesn't believe notp yet her belief state is sensitive to p's subject matter.…”

“…Prominent descriptivists include:[19,45,46,70] 14. Expressivism is compatible with some sentences that embed a bare might claim (e.g., not-mightp) being characteristically descriptive.…”

Précis for Context and Coherence

“…And while there might be disagreements over whether any such particular expression is context-sensitive, and how any such context-sensitivity is realized and resolved, it is safe to say that most authors agree context-sensitivity is pervasive in natural languages. For a sample of the debates over whether and how modals are context sensitive, see, e.g., Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005), Yalcin (2007), von Fintel and Gillies (2008, Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Dowell (2011); for those over predicates of personal taste, see, e.g., Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), Egan (2010), MacFarlane (2014), inter alia; for knowledge ascriptions, see, e.g., DeRose (1995DeRose ( , 2009, Lewis (1996), Cohen (1998), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Schaffer and Szabó (2013), Moss (2023).…”

“…See, e.g.,Grice (1957Grice ( , 1975,Schiffer (1972Schiffer ( , 1981Schiffer ( , 2005,Wettstein (1984),Kaplan (1989aKaplan ( , 1989b,Neale (1990Neale ( , 2004,Reimer (1992),Stanley and Szabó (2000),Glanzberg (2007),King (2014aKing ( , 2014b,Dowell (2011),Lewis (2020), inter multa alia. The extra-linguistic model is often implicitly assumed, even when not explicitly endorsed.…”