Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

Abstract

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim's version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers' notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim's key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.

Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakīrti and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm

“…A central principle of the embodied and enactive cognition paradigm is that at least a subset of our cognitive processes are not entirely internal but rather are co-constituted by external processes that extend into the environment. It is for this reason, I think, that Dharmakīrti's kāryānumāna argument could be interpreted as a species of what Keijzer and Schouten (2007) describe as process externalism: the view that reasons, as active forms of deliberation and cognitive engagement, depend on -and are continuous with -bodily processes that are embedded in the environment of which we are a part. Such an account steers clear of the typical conundrum of metaphysical interpretations: trying to square how someone like Dharmakīrti can argue for both external realism and some version of epistemic idealism.…”

Process Externalism and mental causation: setting metaphysical bounds on cognitive science

“…Moreover, if the causal task that performs a cognitive system is to be understood as the dynamical coupling between extracranial factors, neurological causation, alone, cannot provide a full-blooded account of the behavior of the cognitive system. Furthermore, Keijzer and Schouten (2007) argue that Process Externalism in fact provides a robust conception of mental causation given that neurological properties do not exhaust the causal profile of a cognitive system s. The argument points out that Kim's rejection of the generalization argument-which states that all form of ''high-level'' causation, including biological, physiological chemical, would be pre-empted by some form of fundamental physical causationindicates that there are still genuine cases of ''higherlevel'' causation (cf. Kim, 2005, p. 54) that would vindicate mental causation.…”

“…In this sense, Keijzer and Schouten indicate that mental properties and neural properties, given Process Externalism, do not apply to the same entity; and, for this reason, mental/cognitive properties cannot be identified as second-order properties whose first-order properties would be neural properties. In this sense, given that instances of first-order properties determine the causal powers of an entity, as Kim's example indicates; and the constraint that mental properties cannot be considered as second-order properties, Keijzer and Schouten (2007) conclude that mental/cognitive properties might be considered as first-order properties that determine the causal powers of an entity: ''like chemical and biological properties, mental (cognitive) properties have their own causal properties over and above nonpsychological first-order properties'' (p. 118).…”

“…We can call this particular intracranial conception of the mind Process Internalism (cf. Keijzer & Schouten, 2007, p. 113).…”

Increasing Dental Student Diversity Through the UNLV Dental Prospects Program

“…Introducing predental students to activities of the dental school follows embedded cognition theory, 17 which argues that cognitive development is a result of the interaction of cognition with bodily movement and environmental factors. Following this theory, Dental Prospects Club members shadow students in the UNLV School of Dental Medicine for an entire day to get a sense of what it feels like to be an enrolled dental student.…”