2010
DOI: 10.1080/17440571003669241
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Elite perceptions of anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
16
0

Year Published

2011
2011
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(18 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
2
16
0
Order By: Relevance
“…This might have made an impact on the respondents in Khabarovsk: the results of combating corruption were visible. Students in Lviv, on the contrary, might be disappointed from the recent and ongoing reforms aiming to combat corruption in the country (see, for example, discussions in [Grødeland, 2010;The Economist, 2015]) and could be rather skeptical about a small anti-corruption campaign organized at the university by distributing flyers. Moreover, we simply asked our respondents about their willingness to participate in the campaign; we did not actually organize and run it.…”
Section: Methods and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This might have made an impact on the respondents in Khabarovsk: the results of combating corruption were visible. Students in Lviv, on the contrary, might be disappointed from the recent and ongoing reforms aiming to combat corruption in the country (see, for example, discussions in [Grødeland, 2010;The Economist, 2015]) and could be rather skeptical about a small anti-corruption campaign organized at the university by distributing flyers. Moreover, we simply asked our respondents about their willingness to participate in the campaign; we did not actually organize and run it.…”
Section: Methods and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has gone through two revolutions − the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 -and in both cases, one of the catalysts was the fight against corruption. Yet reforms aiming to combat corruption have arguably not resulted in important changes (see for instance Grødeland (2010) for an evaluation of the post-2004 period and The Economist (2015) for a more recent assessment). As an illustration, Geoffrey Pyatt, US Ambassador to Ukraine, is cited in Åslund (2015) as claiming that actors working for Ukrainian national agencies who are responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption changes are in fact 'making things [even] worse by openly and aggressively undermining reform[s]'.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As such it is argued that due to political and economic obstacles and resistance from oligarchs, the implementation of these laws usually faces decades-long, insurmountable challenges (Aslund 2005;Kuzio 2012). According to the literature, the reason for this is that the Ukrainian oligarchs or elites selectively support these new laws (Aliyev 2016;Grødeland 2010;Malygina 2010;Puglisi 2003). In other words, they back those that work for them and resist the laws that make the further accumulation of wealth difficult.…”
Section: New Legal and Regulatory Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%