Elephants painting? Selfness and the emergence of self states as illustrated in conceptual art

Abstract

The traditional view of the self is that of a singular entity whose ground is an inherent function of the mind. The more recent conception of the self is moving toward the social constructionist concept that its ground is the discourses of the particular culture into which one is born. These two divergent views have created an irresolvable binary of inner/outer that limits their explanatory power. To resolve this dilemma I suggest that the abstract noun 'selfness', indicating a general state, should replace the representational noun 'self', that indicates a specific state. I will propose that 'selfness' is indeed the 'ground' from which our unique self states emerge. I will illustrate this with examples from conceptual art and will discuss its relevance to analytic theory and treatment.

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

“…Perhaps by calling my film ‘degree‐zero cine feminism’ the Village Voice film critic was acknowledging the role of my film in opening space for new discourses about the lived female body to emerge. Perhaps that is the nature of ‘art’– to create openings for imagining new possibilities before words are available to generate new emergent discourses (Foster et al 2004; Horne 2009).…”

“…A sense of identity protects one from the anxiety generated by the disturbing ‘otherness’ of others (Horne 2008) and results in efforts to generate ‘the same and the same’‘repeatedly, over and over’ in order to avoid this anxiety. Through analysis, we learn that this feeling of identity permanence is actually defensive and illusory and can be transformed in a variety of ways (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009). Although our ‘ego complex’ (Jung 1934) or our ‘narrative consciousness’ (Damasio 1999) maintains an ongoing ‘sense of self’ over time, this temporal sense of self remains multiple, decentred, and fragmented (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009) and appears as moods that are the signifiers of self‐states, i.e.…”

“…Through analysis, we learn that this feeling of identity permanence is actually defensive and illusory and can be transformed in a variety of ways (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009). Although our ‘ego complex’ (Jung 1934) or our ‘narrative consciousness’ (Damasio 1999) maintains an ongoing ‘sense of self’ over time, this temporal sense of self remains multiple, decentred, and fragmented (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009) and appears as moods that are the signifiers of self‐states, i.e. the various characters with whom we identify in our stories (Heidegger 1962; Oliver 2002; Horne 2004).…”

Un‐thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung's epistemological basis for psychic reality

“…Fundamental to foundationalism is the basic belief that there was a basis for knowledge and that this basis was derived from a priori postulates. Hence, a priori meaning was indubitable, infallible, and universally known without reference to historical or contemporary contexts (Horne 2008). Such knowledge tends to provide a kind of tacit certainty and permanence that at the same time overshadows particular, impermanent and provisional realities.…”

“…She explores both the idea of a socially constructed self and one that is a product of unconscious processes. Michael Horne posits the emergence of a human being through the amplifications of discontinuous, discrete and discursive ‘self states’ within the multiple discourses that make up our worlds (Horne 2008, 2009). Ladson Hinton (2011) offers a subversive view, which radically disrupts the homogeneity of a totalizing classical Jungian edifice.…”