Baumgartner's assertion that "[providing hydration and nutrition] represents a natural means of preserving life and should be considered ordinary, proportionate, and morally obligatory" is unsupportable on several counts. First, he fails to recognize that the patient's primary goal is not always to prolong life. Second, even if we could somehow agree what "natural" and "ordinary" mean, he offers no justification for the implied claim that there is a right to refuse "artificial" or "extraordinary" interventions but no right to refuse "natural" or "ordinary" ones. Finally, Baumgartner means either that we are morally obliged to override the refusals of both competent and incompetent patients or that only incompetent patients-presumably even those who left clear advance directives to the contrary-must be forced to take food and water. This is an ironic position to take if one claims to represent the rights and interests of "defenseless," or if one insists, "disabled" patients.We agree with Baumgartner that decisions to withdraw life-sustaining therapies should not be motivated by a desire to relieve the burden on others-a so-called duty to die. Fortunately, an understanding of one of the fundamental principles of modern bioethics-respect for the individual-is all that is required to allay this concern. A systematic "duty to die," if it existed, would obviously imply coercion and exploitation of vulnerable individuals, and modern bioethicists would not tolerate such a violation of principle.Finally, we wish to remark on Baumgartner's more-orless oblique comparison of our position to that of (1) defenders of slavery, (2) the Tuskegee experimenters, and (3) Nazi doctors. Because Baumgartner offered no reasons to accept these analogies, we would like to express disappointment that this rhetorical technique is still used so frequently in place of rational discussion.