Electronic Voting in the Netherlands: From Early Adoption to Early Abolishment

Jacobs, Bart; Pieters, Wolter

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_4

Cited by 25 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Whether it is in the long term interest of the operators (and the utility sector at large) remains to be seen. When people are forced to trust a single party, this trust may suddenly collapse, like for voting machines [JP09]. Abuse will get media attention and the premiss of universal trust in the operator will then be questioned.…”

Section: Centralised Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering via Homomorphic Encryption

Garcia

Jacobs

2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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248

225

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The first part of this paper discusses developments wrt. smart (electricity) meters (simply called E-meters) in general, with emphasis on security and privacy issues. The second part will be more technical and describes protocols for secure communication with E-meters and for fraud detection (leakage) in a privacy-preserving manner, using a combination of Paillier's additive homomorphic encryption and additive secret sharing.

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Section: Centralised Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering via Homomorphic Encryption

Garcia

Jacobs

2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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248

225

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“…The original system was designed by Logica CMG and a fully open-source version was later developed [31,32]. Analysis of the main feedback from this experiment was that risk and trust were significant concerns for the public [27] The Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES) system replaced KOA in a follow-up experiment, but many security issues were identified [29]. Subsequently, after an NGO-We Dont Trust Voting Computers-demonstrated that the machine's software could be replaced with a manipulated version within 1 min [19]), the Netherlands stopped the development of their Internet voting project RIES as well as the use of their electronic voting machines.…”

Section: E-voting On-line: the Present Status Around The Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of E-voting: the past, present and future

et al. 2016

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International audienceElectronic voting systems are those which depend on some electronic technology for their correct functionality. Many of them depend on such technology for the communication of election data. Depending on one or more communication channels in order to run elections poses many technical challenges with respect to verifiability, dependability, security, anonymity and trust. Changing the way in which people vote has many social and political implications. The role of election administrators and (independent) observers is fundamentally different when complex communications technology is involved in the process. Electronic voting has been deployed in many different types of election throughout the world for several decades. Despite lack of agreement on whether this has been a ‘success', there has been-in the last few years-enormous investment in remote electronic voting (primarily as a means of exploiting the internet as the underlying communication technology). This paper reviews the past, present and future of on-line voting. It reports on the role of technology transfer, from research to practice, and the range of divergent views concerning the adoption of on-line voting for critical election

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“…An example of different approaches to deployment of a new technology is the introduction of electronic voting in the UK and the Netherlands [19,31,36]. In the Netherlands, the decision on whether to adopt electronic voting machines was made by the local authorities.…”

Section: Electronic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber Security as Social Experiment

Pieters

Hadžiosmanović

Dechesne³

2014

Proceedings of the 2014 New Security Paradigms Workshop

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Lessons from previous experiences are often overlooked when deploying security-sensitive technology in the real world. At the same time, security assessments often suffer from a lack of real-world data. This appears similar to general problems in technology assessment, where knowledge about (side-)effects of a new technology often only appears when it is too late. In this context, the paradigm of new technologies as social experiments was proposed, to achieve more conscious and gradual deployment of new technologies, without losing the ability to steer the developments or make changes in designs. In this paper, we propose to apply the paradigm of new technologies as social experiments to security-sensitive technologies. This new paradigm achieves (i) inherent attention for the ethics of deploying securitysensitive systems in the real world, and (ii) more systematic extraction of real-world security data and feedback into decision making processes.

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Electronic Voting in the Netherlands: From Early Adoption to Early Abolishment

Cited by 25 publications

References 20 publications

Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering via Homomorphic Encryption

Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering via Homomorphic Encryption

A review of E-voting: the past, present and future

Cyber Security as Social Experiment

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