Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption

Chang, Eric C.; Golden, Miriam A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.713521

Cited by 127 publications

(186 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Kunicova and Rose Ackerman (2005) find that closed lists PR are more corrupt than open lists PR, and both are more corrupt than plurality systems. Golden and Chang (2001) Golden and Chang (2007) show that the previous relationship fails to hold up once district magnitude is under a certain threshold.…”

Section: The Literature and The Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 95%

Effect of the proportionality degree of electoral systems on corruption

Alfano¹,

Baraldi²,

Papagni³

2016

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Erasmo PapagniDipartimento di Economia, Seconda Università di Napoli, C.so Gran Priorato di Malta -81043 Capua (Italy). erasmo.papagni@unina2.it AbstractThis work provides a new way to analyze of the effect of electoral system and corruption: through its degree of proportionality. It seems the correct way to consider them because their proportionality degree varies under the same PR, plurality and mixed system. Results show that those degrees of proportionality which allow both voters' and opponents' monitors to exercise their power, induce politicians to avoid corrupt behaviour. This happens when we increase plurality elements into PR.But it is beneficial only up to certain proportionality degrees, after which the corresponding level of corruption begins to grow. For governors the choice of their proportionality degree becomes, therefore, fundamental.JEL Classification: D72, C23

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Section: The Literature and The Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 95%

Effect of the proportionality degree of electoral systems on corruption

Alfano¹,

Baraldi²,

Papagni³

2016

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

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“…The current literature has identified a wide range of factors that may potentially cause corruption in a country. These include economic and demographic factors (e.g., Fisman and Gatti, 2002;Ali and Isse, 2003), political and institutional factors (e.g., Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005;Lederman et al, 2005;Chang and Golden, 2007;Escaleras et al, 2010), judiciary system and bureaucratic factors (e.g., Brunetti and Weder, 2003;Damania et al, 2004), and geographical and cultural factors (e.g., La Porta et al, 1999;Treisman, 2000;Paldam, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax structure and corruption: cross-country evidence

Liu

Feng

2014

Public Choice

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“…By contrast, in closed list systems the relationship is exactly the opposite: only candidates at the top of the list are supposed to emphasise their personality, because in this context the use of personal resources is an instrument for securing selection by party leaders. Empirical findings seem to confirm this interaction, showing that the capacity of candidates to mobilise (illegal) resources depends on both district magnitude and ballot type (Chang & Golden 2007). Also, in terms of ballot structure there are remarkable differences between Greece and Portugal.…”

Section: The External Intervention Of the So-called Troika (Of The Inmentioning

confidence: 74%