Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States

Moser, Robert G.

doi:10.1017/s0043887100009114

Cited by 252 publications

(107 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…While Lijphart obtained a strong negative correlation coefficient (Pearson's r = -0.87) between the two items, a puzzling positive relationship exists between the two variables in this sample. 8 The absence of connection between the index of disproportionality and the number of parties may be due in part to the presence of mixed electoral systems but also to the effects of presidentialism (or weak legislatures) on party systems (see Mainwaring 1993;Massicotte and Blais 1999;Moser 2001;Shugart and Carey 1992). 9 Table 2.1 shows that only effective number of parties are associated with executive dominance, but in the opposite direction that is posited in Patterns of Democracy.…”

Section: A Two-dimensional Conceptual Map Of Democracy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Patterns of Democracy?

Fortin

2008

Z Vgl Polit Wiss

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In Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart (1999) not only contends that democratic institutions cluster in two distinct forms, but also that consensus democracies-when contrasted with majoritarian arrangements-are "kinder, gentler" types of institutional settings (Lijphart 1999: 301-302). the present article reveals that Lijphart's two dimensional map of democracy, although applicable to established democracies, does not apply equally well to post-communist countries. Nevertheless, multivariate empirical verification reveals that some elements included in the consensus democracy framework should be introduced in new constitutions, but perhaps not as the monolithic cluster of basic laws of constitutions originally suggested by Lijphart. Hence the present study casts a shadow on the relevance of the majoritarian versus consensus classification of democratic regimes. Zusammenfassung:In seinem Buch "Patterns of Democracy" behauptet Arend Lijphart (1999) nicht nur, dass demokratische Institutionen in zwei unterschiedlichen Formen auftreten, sondern auch dass Konsensdemokratie -verglichen mit Mehrheitsdemokratie -einen besseren Typus eines institutionellen Rahmens darstellt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Lijpharts zweidimensionale Darstellung von Demokratie nicht auf post-kommunistische Länder übertragen werden kann, obwohl das Konzept auf etablierte Demokratien anwendbar ist. Dennoch verdeutlicht die empirische Überprüfung seines Ansatzes, dass nicht alle, aber durchaus einige Elemente des Konsensdemokratiemodells bei der Gestaltung und Weiterentwicklung neuer Verfassungen berücksichtigt werden sollten. Aus diesem Grund zweifeln die hier vorgestellten Ergebnisse die Relevanz der von Lijphart vorgenommenen Klassifikation für demokratische Regime in postkommunistischen Ländern an.

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Section: A Two-dimensional Conceptual Map Of Democracy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Patterns of Democracy?

Fortin

2008

Z Vgl Polit Wiss

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“…Morgenstern and Vázquez-D'Elía, 2007;Moser, 1999). Some research goes so far as to argue the effects of institutions and cleavages on party systems work in ways that contradict the expectations of the literature (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003; though see also Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2007).…”

Section: Institutions Social Cleavages and The Number Of Partiesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Electoral systems, ethnic cleavages and experience with democracy

Raymond

Huelshoff

Rosenblum

2016

International Political Science Review

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Recent studies show that the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining that the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show that the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

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“…The other is a single-member district (SMD) context in which choices are made in relation to individual candidates, typically using a plurality rule. A popular compromise for states seeking a balance between majoritarian and proportional principles, mixed-member systems are now used in a substantial number of post-Communist states as well (Moser, 1999;Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001b). Elections held under mixed-member systems provide political scientists with fascinating natural laboratories within which to analyze the behavior of the same set of voters in different strategic settings under otherwise controlled conditions, confronting the same party system and the same issue space at the same moment in time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiparty Split-Ticket Voting Estimation as an Ecological Inference Problem

Benoit

Laver²,

Giannetti³

2004

Ecological Inference

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The estimation of vote splitting in mixed-member electoral systems is a common problem in electoral studies, where the goal of researchers is to estimate individual voter transitions between parties on two different ballots cast simultaneously. Because the ballots are cast separately and secretly, however, voter choice on the two ballots must be recreated from separately tabulated aggregate data. The problem is therefore of one of making ecological inferences. Because of the multiparty contexts normally found where mixed-member electoral rules are used, furthermore, the problem involves large-table (R × C ) ecological inference. In this chapter we show how vote-splitting problems in multiparty systems can be formulated as ecological inference problems and adapted for use with King's (1997) ecological inference procedure. We demonstrate this process by estimating vote splitting in the 1996 Italian legislative elections between voters casting party-based list ballots in proportional representation districts and candidate-based plurality ballots in single-member districts. Our example illustrates the pitfalls and payoffs of estimating vote splitting in multiparty contexts, and points to directions for future research in multiparty voting contexts using R × C ecological inference.

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Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States

Cited by 252 publications

References 13 publications

Patterns of Democracy?

Patterns of Democracy?

Electoral systems, ethnic cleavages and experience with democracy

Multiparty Split-Ticket Voting Estimation as an Ecological Inference Problem

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