2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.006
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Electoral manipulation, opposition power, and institutional change: Contesting for electoral reform in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia

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Cited by 21 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Tingkat persaingan tidak hanya mempengaruhi tingkat korupsi yang dilakukan oleh para petahana, tetapi juga akan sangat menentukan upaya partai politik dalam menetralkan usaha manipulasi dari lawannya. Pengalaman di beberapa tempat seperti di negara-negara paska-Soviet (Baghdasaryan dkk., 2018), Singapura (Ong, 2018), dan Zimbabwe (Bratton dkk., 2016) (Casas dkk., 2017). Bahkan, electoral fraud kerap dilakukan dengan melibatkan peran dan asesmen aktor-aktor pada tingkatan lokal, utamanya penyelenggara pemilu di daerah (Sjoberg, 2016).…”
Section: Malpraktik Pemilu Sebagai Bentuk Korupsiunclassified
“…Tingkat persaingan tidak hanya mempengaruhi tingkat korupsi yang dilakukan oleh para petahana, tetapi juga akan sangat menentukan upaya partai politik dalam menetralkan usaha manipulasi dari lawannya. Pengalaman di beberapa tempat seperti di negara-negara paska-Soviet (Baghdasaryan dkk., 2018), Singapura (Ong, 2018), dan Zimbabwe (Bratton dkk., 2016) (Casas dkk., 2017). Bahkan, electoral fraud kerap dilakukan dengan melibatkan peran dan asesmen aktor-aktor pada tingkatan lokal, utamanya penyelenggara pemilu di daerah (Sjoberg, 2016).…”
Section: Malpraktik Pemilu Sebagai Bentuk Korupsiunclassified
“…Even if rulers manipulate electoral boundaries and district magnitudes during electoral periods, malapportionment is not blatant in the sense that it attempts to bias election results not through relentlessly thwarting opposition's election campaigns (as well as lowering their vote shares by fraud) but through reapportionment and redistricting. Along this line, Ong (2018: 162) asserts that malapportionment is a highly obscure electoral manipulation technique that requires a large amount of pre-existing knowledge to comprehend it and thus is less salient to voters. Therefore, high levels of malapportionment are less risky and less likely to be followed by protest movements.…”
Section: Blatant Electoral Fraud and The Value Of A Votementioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 However, blatant electoral manipulation is also a risky strategy: it is overtly illegal and undemocratic, which undermines the incumbent's political legitimacy. Both electoral violence and election cheating damage popular perceptions about the fairness of elections and thus can invoke popular protests which can often be violent and destructive (Ong, 2018). Much research has shown that blatant electoral manipulation backfires on political leaders.…”
Section: Blatant Electoral Fraud and The Value Of A Vote 31 Effect Of Malapportionment On Individual Use Of Cheating And Violencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fundamentally, elections in non-democratic regimes may give the opposition an opportunity to challenge and possibly remove incumbents, despite the unfavorable odds and low success rate. If the regime miscalculates its popularity, elections could become a crippling tool to undercut the regime (Ong, 2018). Lindberg (2007) further argued that when such regimes offer the citizens the opportunity to vote, even in a controlled election or is vulnerable to massive fraud, citizens can contemplate their participatory role as voters, putting some form of belief that the regime should be accountable to the people rather than treating the people as mere subjects of the regime.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%