Electoral Incentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motives Behind Party Defections in Japan

Abstract

Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way.

Sometimes you cannot have it all: Party switching and affiliation motivations as substitutes

“…Not surprisingly, previous research has found a strong connection between electoral considerations and party switching. Specifically, legislators are more likely to switch at the beginning of the legislative term since voters tend to have short memories (Mershon & Shvetsova 2008, Mershon & Shvetsova 2013, and they prefer to affiliate with popular and up-and-coming parties to capitalize on the party's high approval ratings (Heller & Mershon 2005, Kato & Yamamoto 2009, O'Brien & Shomer 2013, Reed & Scheiner 2003. Likewise, legislators are more likely to switch in districts with low educated constituencies, where clientelism is more prevalent and politicians can secure electoral support with goods and services.…”

“…Scholars also differ in terms of whether they find that the ideological distance between a legislator and his party is an important determinant of party switching (Desposato 2006, Desposato & Scheiner 2008, Heller & Mershon 2008, McElroy 2009). Similarly inconsistent results have been found with respect to the effect of electoral prospects on legislators' incentives to defect (Desposato & Scheiner 2008, Heller & Mershon 2005, Kato & Yamamoto 2009, Reed & Scheiner 2003, O'Brien & Shomer 2013.…”

Infrastructure as the Magnet of Power: Explaining Why Japanese Legislators Left and Returned to the LDP

“…Although a series of corruption scandals had damaged public trust in the party, there was little indication that the party would fail to retain a majority in the upcoming election. The defection of LDP incumbents therefore puzzled observers of Japanese politics and spawned several empirical studies (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995;Kato 1998;Reed and Scheiner 2003;Tatebayashi 2004;Desposato and Scheiner 2009). These studies conclude that at least two variables are significantly correlated with the probability of the incumbents' defection.…”

“…The measure of policy preferences for reform is adopted from Reed and Scheiner (2003). Reform is a dichotomous variable and is coded as 1 only if the incumbent signed "Chuscnkyokusei haishi sengen" by December 18, 1992. 17 Rampant money scandals culminated in the Recruit Company scandal in 1989, which led to Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's resignation.…”

“…As Reed and Scheiner (2003) note, signing the resolution was regarded as opposing the party leadership and entailed significant political risks. For instance, it is noticeable that none of the incumbents who signed the resolution has ascended to the LDP's party presidency to date.…”