Electoral coordination in Anglophone Africa

Abstract

Electoral coordination has been a primary concern for scholars of African politics, interested in topics such as ethnic conflict mitigation and democratisation, for decades. However, understanding of micro-level electoral coordination in Sub-Saharan Africa is generally still very limited. This study is the first to investigate voter coordination in SubSaharan Africa using constituency-level election results. Studying 20 single-member district elections during the period 1990-2010 in five Anglophone African countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia) demonstrates that many African elections continue to show low levels of electoral coordination. Using a multi-level regression analysis, the study shows that the most important explanation for low levels of coordination across Africa is high voter volatility. It is argued that insufficient information makes it hard for voters and candidates to act strategically. However, the level of democracy, which has been emphasised in earlier aggregate level research, does not significantly affect the level of coordination.

Captured Countryside? Stability and Change in Sub-National Support for African Incumbent Parties

“…A substantial literature has dealt with the adverse impact of opposition disunity for electoral competiveness on both the national and local level (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Rakner and Svåsand 2004;Arriola 2013;Wahman 2014) and as disunity may vary across constituencies we use it as a control. To measure 23 In one case, Zambia in 2011, the president was born outside the country's borders.…”

“…Similarly, the expected support for a government party parliamentary candidate is 35% in urban constituencies outside the president's home region, compared to 55.5% in rural constituencies within the president's home region. The fact that the predicted support for the government party MP is above 50% is remarkable, given the generally high level of constituency level party fractionalization in African SMD elections (Wahman 2014).…”

Opposing Power

“…When faced with one powerful incumbent candidate elected by a plurality of the popular vote, fragmented opposition elites have very low chances of victory if they contest alone (Rakner and van de Walle 2009;Wahman 2014;Ziegfeld and Tudor 2017). Multiple opposition presidential candidates splinter the anti-regime vote with divided loyalties, allowing the autocrat to stroll toward victory.…”

Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent

“…One is left wondering whether the latter is possible, if the former is true. Second, most of these accounts rely solely on illustrative evidence, or provide detailed empirical and comparative data, but only for a small number of parties in a small number of countries (Arriola, 2013; Basedau and Stroh, 2008; Elischer, 2013; Gilliomee and Simkins, 1999; Kalua, 2011; LeBas, 2011; Mac Giollabhui, 2013; Riedl, 2014; Southall, 2016; Wahman, 2014). This seriously limits our ability to understand party organizational strength and presence on the continent, or to test its effects on the quality of democracy in any sort of rigorous way.…”