Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems

Abstract

How do fluid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability? To address this question, the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in Poland since 1991. They find that when district-level economic outcomes are bad, voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party. As a result, electoral control in Poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies. However, the authors also find that, in contrast to mature democracies, legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates. When they do so, their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists. These empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control, fluid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability.

The Costs and Benefits of Party Switching in Mexico

“…For example, Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) find returning candidates who switched parties were more likely to win compared to newcomers in Poland and the Czech Republic. Zielinski et al (2005) find when the economy is not performing well in Poland, incumbents who switch out of a governing party into an opposition party are more likely to win re-election compared to governing party loyalists and fare just as well as opposition party loyalists.…”

“…However, party switching can undermine the value of party labels (Desposato 2006). Moreover, politicians can switch parties to escape accountability for bad policies, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of elections as a means of popular control over elected representatives (Zielinski et al 2005).…”

The Ties that Bind: Do Group Associations among Legislators Matter for Political Parties?

“…Smaller parties appear and disappear regularly, but even among the stable parties there has been mobility across party lines among candidates and elected MPs (McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011;Shabad and Słomczyński 2004;Zieliński et al 2005). Defection through roll-call votes, although less overt, is also persistent (Tavits 2009).…”

“…Since the collapse of communism, instability strongly characterizes the party systems in Central and Eastern Europe: political parties have appeared and disappeared at each electoral cycle, MPs frequently switch parties, and governments turn over regularly (Gwiazda 2009;Nalewajko and Wesołowski 2007;Zieliński et al 2005). Yet, despite this sort of instability, political parties in many new democracies worldwide appear surprisingly cohesive (see Carey and Reynolds 2007;Field 2013;Heller and Mershon 2008).…”

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“…In Brazil, between 1986 and 1990, the poor performance of the incumbent Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB) encouraged legislators to switch parties in order to enhance their re-election chances (Ames, 2002: 71). Similarly, Zielinski et al (2005) investigate defection in the Polish Sejm between the 1991 and 2001 elections and find that when the economic performance of the government was disappointing, deputies who defected from the dominant party had a higher chance of re-election than those who did not switch. 3…”