Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Ellman, Matthew; Wantchékon, Léonard

doi:10.1162/003355300554836

Cited by 116 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…It is simply a binary choice for the poor (already the median voter and thus the tax setters in the democracy). The article closest to ours is Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) who study electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. As in our model the decision whether to respond with riots (disruptive interference) is made after elections have taken place and the possibility of riots affects the platform choice of parties.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources

Cabrales

Hauk

2010

The Economic Journal

106

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We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. It also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed. This finding is corroborated in cross section regressions.Until World War II the economics profession tended to believe that natural resources were an unqualified blessing for the nation that owned them. However, in the post World-War II period, the evidence against this belief started accumulating: many resource rich countries grew very slowly and economists started to talk about the curse of natural resources. There is a large number of empirical papers which find evidence of this curse

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources

Cabrales

Hauk

2010

The Economic Journal

106

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“…First, it relates to the literature that examines the specific workings of new democracies in terms of their economic and political outcomes. Some examples are Ellman and Wantchekon (2000); Brender and Drazen (2005, 2008Keefer (2007); and Keefer and Vlaicu (2007). My paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the incentives to engage in voter intimidation and clientelism from the local government standpoint and by finding evidence of these patterns, using a novel dataset for the first democratic election in Indonesia post-Soeharto.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia

Martínez-Bravo

2014

American Economic Review

107

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This paper shows that the body of appointed officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new democracies. I develop a model that predicts that appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters during national level elections because of their career concerns. I test the implications of the model using data from Indonesia's transition to democracy. Both the pattern of alignment of electoral results between village and district levels and the pattern of subsequent turnover of appointed village heads corroborate the predictions of the model. (JEL D72, H77, H83, O17, O18)The transitions of nondemocratic regimes to democracy present a number of economic and political challenges. In addition to experiencing political instability and social unrest, nascent democracies operate in the context of the institutional legacy of the previous nondemocratic regime, which can condition the outcome of the first democratic elections and thus the economic and political equilibrium. One of these legacies is the body of local officials: 1 in most democratic transitions, a majority of local officials selected during the nondemocratic regime remain in their positions at the time of the first democratic election. The difficulties inherent in undertaking several simultaneous reforms in the aftermath of the fall of a nondemocratic regime can prevent an immediate turnover in the government administration, especially among the lower-and local-level ranks.There is extensive documentation of the fact that new democracies differ from established democracies in their economic and political outcomes. For instance, 1 Several scholars have documented the key role that local officials play in nondemocratic regimes and regimes in transition.

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“…The political role of extra-parliamentary pressure groups has been examined by Ellman and Wantchekon (2000). More generally, the commitment problems that result from the transient nature of de facto power is an important feature of the models of revolution and democratisation that have been developed by Robinson (2001, 2006).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Foundations of Trust and Distrust: Reforms and Protests in France

Lindvall¹

2011

West European Politics

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Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Cited by 116 publications

References 6 publications

The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources

The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources

The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia

The Political Foundations of Trust and Distrust: Reforms and Protests in France

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