Elections in the Arab World

Abstract

This article examines the determinants of voting in competitive authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. In contrast to scholars who view elections in the Arab World purely as patronage contests, we argue that citizens also care about policy outputs and use turnout as a way to signal their approval or disapproval with the regime. We draw on the literature on economic voting in democratic regimes to develop an argument about economic voting under authoritarian conditions, and we propose a mediation model to get at the mechanisms of economic voting. We test our argument with original data based on surveys conducted in seven Arab countries between 2006 and 2009. Our results show that although patronage helps to explain turnout, especially among high-income citizens, policy outcomes are also important in the calculus of voting. Most voters turn out to vote to show approval of the regime and its economic performance.

Ambivalent Voting Behavior: Ideology, Efficacy, and the Socioeconomic Dynamic of Voter Turnout in Iran, 1997–2005

“…Therefore, while dissatisfied citizens had lower overall odds of voting in all three elections, among dissatisfied respondents (Model 3), those with higher levels of education were the main groups who abstained from voting in 2001 and 2005. This finding is consistent with a growing body of research that suggests compared to those who are satisfied with the status quo, dissatisfied voters are less likely to turn out (Bahry and Silver 1990;De Miguel et al 2015;Karklins 1986;Lust 2009;Zhong and Chen 2002).…”

“…Additionally, although the impact of opposition participation on electoral turnout is not typically a focus of theories of electoral authoritarianism-which yield no clear predictions regarding the role of opposition-it is plausible that the participation of opposition forces mobilizes factions of dissatisfied voters to turn out. Studies of authoritarian elections suggest that in undemocratic settings, opposition may see elections as a survival strategy and a political opportunity to resist the regime, to create a democratic change or even to reap the benefits of being in the regime and hoping for nomination the next time around (De Miguel et al 2015;Greene 2007;Magolani 2006). As Masoud (2008:40) notes about Islamic parties in Egypt, electoral participation may also give the opposition access to public resources that it "can channel to supporters and use to bolster itself, and a pulpit from which to spread its message and potentially delegitimize the regime."…”

“…Taken together, theories on electoral authoritarianism in Latin America and the Middle East lead to several empirical predictions regarding the profile of voters. First, these theories suggest that the unfair nature of elections leads many prodemocracy citizens, dissatisfied voters, to refrain from casting their vote as an act of resistance (Bahry and Silver 1990;De Miguel et al 2015;Karklins 1986;Lust 2009;Zhong and Chen 2002), or to cast a spoiled or blank ballot (De Miguel et al 2015). Studies on the Soviet Union, for instance, suggest that less satisfied citizens and those who oppose traditional regime norms were more likely to ignore mandatory voting and stay at home on Election Day (Bahry and Silver 1990;Karklins 1986).…”

“…Major explanations of voting in authoritarian regimes stress factors such as mandatory voting (Geddes 2005;Power and Roberts 1995), clientelism and patronage (Blaydes 2006;Greene 2007;Lust 2009;Lust-Okar 2005;Magaloni 2006), state manipulations, the punishment of nonvoters (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013;Blaydes 2006Blaydes , 2011Geddes 2005;Greene 2007;Magaloni 2006), or the mobilization of opposition (De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 2015;Greene 2007;Magolani 2006;. Together, these studies suggest that the unfair nature of elections compels many urban middle-class voters, as well as dissatisfied citizens and those in favor of democracy, to abstain (De Miguel et al 2015;Karklins 1986;Zhong and Chen 2002), while the poor and voters with less education turn out in great numbers (Blaydes 2006(Blaydes , 2011Stokes 2005;Tezcur 2008). The underlying assumption behind these theories is that due to the greater reliance of the poor on state income and resources, the state has greater power in mobilizing them to cast their ballots.…”

Vote for Your Family! Particularism, Support for Democracy and Support for Shari’a in the Arab World

“…The so-called "Arab Spring" has been regarded as a potential new wave of democratization, the rise of the peoples within several Arab countries against oppressive elites breathed the promise of a democratic Middle East. Although multifaceted, with causes and implications specific to each country, these protests were in large part moved by feelings of frustration over poor economic performance and by the refusal of the existing political systems that were perceived as corrupted and non-democratic (de Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 2015). The question that only the future will answer is whether or not these countries will be able to make the transition towards consolidated democracy.…”