Election Cycles in MPs' outside Interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010

Abstract

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The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last‐Term Politicians

“…On the one hand, the perceived costs of outside interests might well decline because any expectation of electoral retribution is removed. Outside jobs are often perceived by citizen‐principals as symptoms that their elected political agents do not take their parliamentary job sufficiently seriously (Allen and Birch ; Geys ; Geys and Mause )—even though recent survey experiments demonstrate that citizens do not respond negatively to all types of second jobs/incomes (Campbell and Cowley ). However, last‐term MPs know that they cannot be punished by voters through the ballot box for maintaining directorships, consultancy jobs, and so on.…”

“…Finally, although MPs voted out of parliament record at best limited work‐effort readjustments in their final term, the observed effects suggest in creases in parliamentary effort and de creases in outside interests. One admittedly tentative explanation might be that these MPs accurately foresaw their deteriorated electoral prospects and invested more time and energy into parliamentary activities while reducing potentially politically costly outside activities (Geys ). In any case, the results for MPs voted out of parliament highlight that the opposite behavioral changes observed among retiring and retreating MPs are likely to reflect conscious responses to the elimination of the accountability mechanism embedded in elections—thus supporting the notion that elections have significant disciplining power.…”

Electoral cycles in MPs’ salaries: evidence from the German states

“…Evidence on how salaries influenced efforts in the European parliament is mixed (Fisman et al 2013, Mocan and Altindag 2013, Braendle 2015. 4 In the German states, MPs decided annually on their own salaries, particularly in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (currently, the salaries of MPs are coupled with employees' salaries 3 In the United Kingdom, elections influenced MPs' outside activities (Geys 2013). In the United States, bureaucrats' salaries increased more in election years (Borjas 1984).…”

“…On public investment and re-election prospects, see Katsimi and Sarantides (2015). Vanhuysse 2009, 2013, Schneider 2010, Mechtel and Potrafke 2013, Potrafke and Roesel 2016, Riem 2016aand 2016b. On the municipal level, elections have been shown to influence total spending, local business tax rates, and public administration decisions Riedel 2014, Garmann in press).…”

German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort

“…For the UK House of Commons, it has been investigated whether MPs' outside interests follow election cycles (Geys, 2013). If these activities are seen critically by the public, they should decrease prior to elections to preserve chances of winning.…”