Egypt's Nuclear Weapons Program

Rublee, Maria Rost

doi:10.1080/10736700601071637

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…We code four states as proliferators that are not identified as pursuing nuclear weapons by Jo and Gartzke: Australia (1968-71);Egypt (1960-76);Libya (1970Libya ( -2003andSyria (1997-2004). In all four of these cases, there is substantial evidence from primary sources that nuclear weapons programs existed during the years we cite (see Levite 2002/03;Singh and Way 2004;Hymans 2006;Rublee 2006;Schneidmiller 2009). 11.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Disaggregating Noncompliance

Fuhrmann

Berejikian

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors' argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Disaggregating Noncompliance

Fuhrmann

Berejikian

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…For example, after having flirted with the nuclear option in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, Egypt decided that the bomb was not worth the price of regional stability, economic development and its increasingly close ties to Washington. 26 Some other states have tried to take advantage of the NPT's imperfect verification regime to acquire nuclear bombs covertly. Muammar Al-Gaddafi's Libya, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Bashar Al-Assad's Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran, have all, at various points, tried to acquire the necessary technology.…”

Section: The Impact Of the Arab Springmentioning

confidence: 99%

Israel and the 2012 Middle East Nuclear Meeting

Horovitz

2011

The RUSI Journal

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“…First, the numbers of nuclear weapons necessary for secure second-strike are lacking in newly nuclear states Press, 2006a,b, 2009). Second, the counterforce value of nuclear weapons is relatively much higher for smaller states, such as Israel (Quester, 1983), and attempted proliferators, such as Egypt (Levite, 2003;Rublee, 2006), than it is for states with large conventional militaries. As stated above, the offensive incentives associated with low levels of nuclear weapons and the cost-effectiveness of nuclear versus conventional balancing make their use a more rational option for these states than for the great powers.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Egypt also developed its interest in nuclear energy through its participation in the 'Atoms for Peace' program during the 1950s, toward the beginning of the Nasser regime. However, military applications were not Egypt's principal concern until 1960, when the regime became aware of Israel's Dimona reactor and the military direction of its neighbor and rival's nuclear program (Quester, 1983;Rublee, 2006). The Egyptian nuclear weapons program was therefore a direct challenge to that of the Israelis, who had bested the combined Arab armies during the 1948 war.…”

Section: Egypt: a Case Of Nuclearization Deterredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states

Dittmeier

2013

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Traditional interpretations of politics among nuclear-weapons states—as epitomized by Schelling’s theory of deterrence through mutually-assured destruction—are less useful in today’s proliferation environment than they were during the Cold War’s superpower rivalry. As regionally-important states begin to pursue nuclear weapons, they do so in an environment that is shaped by the preferences and behaviors of the great powers. Using an elaboration on Powell’s bargaining model of conflict, this article shows that nuclear proliferation radically alters the future distribution of power, introducing a commitment problem vis-à-vis conventionally-stronger neighbors. This explains the occurrence of preemptive war in cases of attempted nuclearization, although the empirical paucity of such bargaining failures requires the shadow of great-power intervention in understanding the relations of second-tier states.

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Egypt's Nuclear Weapons Program

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

Disaggregating Noncompliance

Disaggregating Noncompliance

Israel and the 2012 Middle East Nuclear Meeting

Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states

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