Egalitarianism

Hirose, Iwao

doi:10.4324/9781315772004

Cited by 29 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…A second reason is that the worse off are morally more important in some way. Such a concern for the worse off is asserted by both prioritarian, egalitarian, and, arguably also, sufficientarian theories of distribution (Hirose 2014). A third reason, somewhat more speculative, is that a public health care system is viewed by many as a form of safety net.…”

Section: What Is Illness Severity and Why Should We Care?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?

Jølstad

Juth

2022

Utilitas

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Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences (SD): small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to accept some form of relevance view, where some age differences are irrelevant. This view can accommodate SD, but at the expense of consistent priority orderings. Severity thus becomes unsuitable for systematic decision-making. We argue that SD should be dismissed and that we should accept a continuous relationship between severity of illness and age.

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Section: What Is Illness Severity and Why Should We Care?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?

Jølstad

Juth

2022

Utilitas

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“…Utility level is also important to realize a full version of interpersonal comparison of utility 27, 41 . Future studies should conduct interpersonal comparison of utility level, which enables distributions according to variable principles discussed in modern justice theories other than utilitarianism 27, 41, 80 .…”

Section: Supplementary Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpersonal Comparison of Utility by Measuring Neural Activity

Matsumori

Iijima

Yomogida

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Aggregating welfare across individuals to reach collective decisions is one of the most fundamental problems in our society. Interpersonal comparison of utility is pivotal and inevitable for welfare aggregation, because if each person's utility is not interpersonally comparable, there is no rational aggregation procedure that simultaneously satisfies even some very mild conditions for validity (Arrow's impossibility theorem). However, scientific methods for interpersonal comparison of utility have thus far not been available. Here, we have developed a method for interpersonal comparison of utility based on brain signals, by measuring the neural activity of participants performing gambling tasks. We found that activity in the medial frontal region was correlated with changes in expected utility, and that, for the same amount of money, the activity evoked was larger for participants with lower household incomes than for those with higher household incomes. Furthermore, we found that the ratio of neural signals from lower-income participants to those of higher-income participants coincided with estimates of their psychological pleasure by "impartial spectators", i.e. disinterested third-party participants satisfying specific conditions. Finally, we derived a decision rule based on aggregated welfare from our experimental data, and confirmed that it was applicable to a distribution problem. These findings suggest that our proposed method for interpersonal comparison of utility enables scientifically reasonable welfare aggregation by escaping from Arrow's impossibility and has implications for the fair distribution of economic goods. Our method can be further applied for evidence-based policy making in nations that use cost-benefit analyses or optimal taxation theory for policy evaluation.

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“…the view that benefits to the worse off matter more) (cf. Adler 2012 ; Dworkin 1981 ; Hirose 2015 ; Holtug 2010 , chs. 8–10; Kappel 1997 ; Nagel 1979 , 1991 ; Rawls 1971 ; Parfit 1997 ; Segall 2016 , Chap.…”

Section: The Complete Lives Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health, priority to the worse off, and time

Herlitz

2018

Med Health Care and Philos

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It is a common view that benefits to the worse off should be given priority when health benefits are distributed. This paper addresses how to understand who is worse off in this context when individuals are differently well off at different times. The paper argues that the view that this judgment about who is worse off should be based solely on how well off individuals are when their complete lives are considered (i.e. ‘the complete lives view’) is implausible in this context. Instead, it is argued that a pluralistic stance toward this issue should be accepted. This pluralistic stance recognizes that also the view that only focuses on how well off individuals are now and in the future (i.e. ‘the forward-looking view’) is relevant. The argument is based on appeals to intuitive judgments concerning who is worse off in different cases and reference to various underlying reasons why priority to benefits to the worse off is justified.

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Egalitarianism

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?

Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?

Interpersonal Comparison of Utility by Measuring Neural Activity

Health, priority to the worse off, and time

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