Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development

Bhaskaran, Sreekumar R.; Krishnan, Vish

doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1010

Cited by 408 publications

(240 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…As the same as Xie et al [6] , market demand is assumed to be linearly related to market prices, just as the following equation (3). Here d means market demand elasticity coefficient to prices.…”

Section: Notations and Mathematical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similar to relations among members of supply chains, in such a service chain composed of an e-business firm and a 3PLs, game theory is well proper to analyze their decision interactions and system balance. Bhaskaran et al have studied 2 of 9 cooperation among new product development members in green supply chain background [3] . In the same backdrop, Savaskan et al have discussed manufacturer-leading waste goods recycling channels.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems

Guo

2017

Preprint

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To improve carbon efficiency for urban logistics service system composed of a third-party logistics service provider (3PLs) and an e-business enterprise, low-carbon operation game between them was studied. Considering low carbon technology investment cost and sales expansion effect of low carbon level, profit functions for both players were constituted. Based on their different bargaining capabilities, totally 5 types of game scenarios were designed. Through analytical solution, Nash Equilibria under varied scenarios were obtained. By analyzing these equilibria, 4 major propositions were given, in which, some key variables and system performance index were compared. Results show that the best system yields could only be achieved under the fully cooperative situation; limited cooperation only for carbon emission reduction would not benefit the system performance improvement; E-business enterprise-leading game's performance overtook 3PLs-leading ones.

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Section: Notations and Mathematical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems

Guo

2017

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Such setting with somewhat variation is widely applied in the video rentals (Dana and Spier, 2001;Mortimer, 2008;Cachon and Lariviere, 2005;Gerchak et al, 2006;Van der Veen and Venugopal, 2005) and the internet content services (Foros et al, 2009). The non-consigned R-S arrangement is also an effective mechanism for collaborative new product development in intercompany alliances (Bhaskaran and Krishnan, 2009). Some work in this stream deals with agent-based negotiation systems (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2009), three-staged supply chain (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2004), two-period newsvendor problem (Linh and Hong, 2009), and the effect of joint adoption of R-S and advanced booking discount programs (Bellantuono et al, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On eBay's Fee Structure from a Channel Coordination Perspective

Chen

Cheng²,

Chien

2010

Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

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Abstract. Can eBay.com's fee structure coordinate the channel? It's a critical strategic problem in e-commerce operations and an interesting research hypothesis as well. eBay's fees include three parts: monthly subscription fee, insertion fee, and final value fee (i.e., a revenue sharing portion), which represent a generic form of revenue sharing fee structure between the retailer and the vendor in a supply chain. This research deals with such a channel consisting of a price-setting vendor who sells products through eBay's marketplace exclusively to the end customers. The up-and down-stream channel relationship is consignment-based revenue sharing. We use a game-theoretic approach with assumption of the retailer (i.e., eBay.com) being a Stackelberg-leader and the vendor being a follower. The Stackelberg-leader decides on the terms of revenue sharing contract (i.e., fee structure), and the follower (vendor) decides on how many units to sell and the items' selling price. This study formulates several profit-maximization models by considering the effects of the retail price on the demand function. Under such settings, we show that eBay's fee structure can improve the channel efficiency; yet it cannot coordinate the channel optimally.

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“…The area of cooperative game theory, which focuses on how to fairly allocate costs among players, has gained recent interest in operations management (see Cachon [13], Nagarajan and Sosic [36], Bhaskaran and Krishnan [7], Kim and Netessine [28]). Of main interest to this paper are the cost sharing mechanisms for inventory management (Xu and Yang [48]), facility location (Pál and Tardos [37]) and Steiner tree (Jain and Vazirani [27]) problems.…”

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confidence: 99%

From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems

Elmachtoub

Levi

2015

Mathematics of OR

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We consider a general class of online optimization problems, called online selection problems, where customers arrive sequentially, and one has to decide upon arrival whether to accept or reject each customer. If a customer is rejected, then a rejection cost is incurred. The accepted customers are served with minimum possible cost, either online or after all customers have arrived. The goal is to minimize the total production costs for the accepted customers plus the rejection costs for the rejected customers. These selection problems are related to online variants of offline prize collecting combinatorial optimization problems that have been widely studied in the computer science literature. In this paper, we provide a general framework to develop online algorithms for this class of selection problems. In essence the algorithmic framework leverages any cost sharing mechanism with certain properties into a poly-logarithmic competitive online algorithm for the respective problem; the competitive ratios are shown to be near-optimal. We believe that the general and transparent connection we establish between cost sharing mechanisms and online algorithms could lead to additional online algorithms for problems beyond the ones studied in this paper.

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Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development

Abstract: informs doi 10.1287/mnsc.1090.101

Cited by 408 publications

References 25 publications

Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems

Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems

On eBay's Fee Structure from a Channel Coordination Perspective

From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems

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