Efficient techniques for realizing geo-spatial access control

Abstract

The problem of key management for access control systems has been well-studied, and the literature contains several schemes for hierarchy-based and temporal-based access control. The problem of key management in such systems is how to assign keys to users such that each user is able to compute and have access to the appropriate resources while minimizing computation and storage requirements. In the current paper, we consider key management schemes for geo-spatial access control. That is, the access control policy assigns to a user a specific geographic area, and the user consequently obtains access to her area or information about it.In this work, the geography is modeled as an m×n grid of cells (let m ≥ n). Each cell has its own key associated with it, and a user who wants to access the content of a cell needs to obtain its key. Each user obtains access to a rectangular area (or a finite collection of such rectangles) and is able compute keys corresponding to the cells that comprise her area.Our main result is an efficient scheme with the following properties: (i) each user obtains a small constant number of secret keys that permit access to an arbitrary rectangular sub-grid, (ii) computation to derive the key of a specific cell in that rectangle consists of a constant number of efficient operations, and (iii) the server needs to maintain O(mn(log log m) 2 log * m) public information accessible to all users. The public storage requirement is the worstcase bound and can be improved if the grid is partitioned into regions where the cells of a region share the same key.

Constructing Key Assignment Schemes from Chain Partitions

“…A third area for potential research is to generalize our constructions to more than two scalable components (most likely using a recursive construction with one of our schemes from Sections 3 and 4 as a base case). Finally, we would like to apply our schemes to access control for geo-spatial data [17], because the policies used are rather similar to those for scalable multimedia formats.…”

Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Assignment: An Overview

“…Security Related Notes Akl-Taylor [3] provable [1], [4] time-invariant; provably secure with the strong RSA assumption Tzeng [4] compromised [8] [7] Lucas sequence [5] has known weaknesses [9]; e i generation defective [21] Chien [10] compromised [12] [11], [13], [14] fix with security proof available in full version of [16] Bertino et al [14] compromised [16] fix with security proof available in full version of [16] Yeh [2] compromised [17] [18] Huang-Chang [19] compromised [20] Wang-Laih [1] no formal proof Tzeng [21] no formal proof e i 's become pairwise relatively prime (thus slightly different from [3], [4]) Ateniese et al [17] provable contributes the first formal framework and two provably secure schemes Atallah et al [22] provable [23] incorporates time-dependent capabilities to existent key management Briscoe [24] no formal proof [25] purely time-based, no security hierarchy time, Tzeng proposed a secure data access system [21] based on an anonymous authentication scheme and his new timebased hierarchical KA scheme, the latter among which appears immune to collusion attacks. In the same year, the first result that provides a formal framework for time-bound hierarchical KA schemes was given by Ateniese et al [17], where the notion of security for such KA schemes is formalized and two provably secure solutions are also proposed.…”

“…For example, Atallah et al presented in 2007 a provably secure approach that can incorporate time-dependent capabilities to existent key management schemes [22]. If the time is regarded as a single dimension, their solution can be extended to higher dimensions, and a proof of concept with respect to two dimensions is presented in [23] in the geospatial setting. In 2008, Srivatsa et al followed the same idea, and applied Briscoe's time-dependent KA scheme [24] to three dimensions, in a similar context of location-based broadcast services [25].…”

Bounded vector signatures and their applications

“…In these settings, attributes that determine access can often be encoded within a d-dimensional space. For instance, in some location-based access control schemes [3,43], the dimensions encode the location of the entity in 3-dimensional space, plus an extra dimension for time. A service provider can sign subranges describing the allowable access attributes for the entities in the distributed system and provide them with their respective subranges as a non-interactive access token.…”