Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy

Kurizaki, Shuhei

doi:10.1017/s0003055407070396

Cited by 144 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Another issue has focused on rational choice modeling (Iida et al 2015). Alongside journal articles that use econometrics, game theory, and computational modeling (e.g., Tago 2005;Kurizaki 2007;Yamamoto 2015), books that employ these approaches are increasingly being published in English (e.g., Suzuki and Okada 2017;Tadokoro, Egashira, and Yamamoto 2018). Given this situation, together with normative approaches and Asian studies, scientific approaches have become more promising in Japanese IR studies.…”

Section: Scientific Orientation: Old and Newmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Triad of Normative, Pragmatic, and Science-Oriented Approaches : The Development of International Relations Theory in Japan Revisited

Yamamoto¹

2018

kjis

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The meaning of international relations (IR) theory has been recently contested. Advocates for various ideas can be categorized into three groups: normative, pragmatic, and science-oriented. This paper traces this division by considering the development of IR studies in Japan, and arguing: (1) that the normative approach in Japanese IR studies is based on the pacifism/pacificism formed after WWII-the widespread diffusion of this idea throughout Japanese society influenced realists as well as liberals; (2) that the field of Asian studies in Japan has developed a pragmatic approach, producing abundant research that has not been sufficiently disseminated outside Japan; and (3) that, although the scientific method was stagnant in Japan in the late twentieth century, it is making a resurgence. By recognizing these facts, Japanese IR studies are expected to play a larger role in developing this field worldwide.

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Section: Scientific Orientation: Old and Newmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Triad of Normative, Pragmatic, and Science-Oriented Approaches : The Development of International Relations Theory in Japan Revisited

Yamamoto¹

2018

kjis

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“…22 Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare 1998;Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002;Tabellini 1987, 1999. 23 Kurizaki 2007, 555. 24 Kurizaki 2007. 25 Leventoglu and Tarar 2005.…”

Section: Encouraging Private Settlement Over Public Rulingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining

Kucik¹,

Pelc²

2015

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Transparency is one of the most contested aspects of international organizations. While observers frequently call for greater oversight of policy making, evidence suggests that settlement between states is more likely when negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) legal body provides a useful illustration of these competing perspectives. As in many courts, WTO dispute settlement is designed explicitly to facilitate settlement through private consultations. However, this study argues that the privacy of negotiations creates opportunities for states to strike deals that disadvantage others. Looking at product-level trade flows from all disputes between 1995 and 2011, it finds that private (early) settlements lead to discriminatory trade outcomes -complainant countries gain disproportionately more than the rest of the membership. When the facts of a case are made known through a ruling, these disproportional gains disappear entirely. The article also finds that third-party participation -commonly criticized for making settlement less likely -significantly reduces disparities in post-dispute trade. It then draws parallels to domestic law and concludes with a set of policy prescriptions.How much transparency should there be in global governance? While public opinion is quick to call for greater openness in international institutions, political scientists remain ambivalent. Recent findings show that when bargaining is conducted in public view, negotiators are vulnerable to influence by powerful domestic interests. These domestic pressures create incentives to adopt more aggressive stances, which significantly reduce the prospects for compromise between parties. 1 As a result, bargaining may be more productive behind closed doors, shielded from the view of hardline interests. The supposed relationship between privacy and effectiveness explains why countries frequently conduct diplomacy and international bargaining in private. 2 The benefits of low transparency are evident in various international institutional settings. For example, privacy allows governments to shift blame to international institutions like the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reducing the political fallout over painful economic reforms, and making these reforms more likely. 3 For example, greater transparency in international financial institutions reduces the effect of such interventions. In addition, despite considerable pressure for change, there is evidence that investment disputesincluding those that proceed under the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of

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“…But we must be careful in drawing general conclusions from this example. For instance, there are bargaining problems in which cheap talk does affect the outcome (Farrell & Gibbons 1989, Smith 1998, Sartori 2002, Ramsay 2004, Kurizaki 2007. Perhaps in more complicated bargaining situations there are things that the disputants are willing to tell the mediator that they are not willing to tell each other.…”

Section: The General Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Fey¹,

Ramsay²

2010

World Pol.

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We study the conflict mediation problem, sometimes called "shuttle diplomacy," when the mediator acts as a go-between and must gather information from the disputants. In the context of a general model of information mediation, we show that the incentive that disputants have to lie to the mediator undoes any advantage that might be gained by adding communication with a third party. In fact, our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome that is achievable through mediation is also achievable as an equilibrium outcome of a game with unmediated pre-play communication. This is true even when the mediator is allowed to have arbitrary preferences or biases. We then test our empirical prediction on dispute management efforts between 1937 and 1985. The analysis supports the hypothesis that information mediation has no effect in environments where the mediator has no independent source of information.

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Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy

Cited by 144 publications

References 26 publications

A Triad of Normative, Pragmatic, and Science-Oriented Approaches : The Development of International Relations Theory in Japan Revisited

A Triad of Normative, Pragmatic, and Science-Oriented Approaches : The Development of International Relations Theory in Japan Revisited

Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

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