2014
DOI: 10.15185/izawol.34
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Efficient markets, managerial power, and CEO compensation

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…However, before discussing the precise details of RST, a brief overview of existing theories will be given. Since several excellent and detailed reviews of current theories are already available (Bognanno, 2014;Conyon, 2006;Devers et al, 2007;Otten, 2007), our systematic outline of the "efficient market" and the "managerial power" theory will be brief. Subsequently, we will add a systematic discussion of the relational signalling theory.…”
Section: Signalling Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, before discussing the precise details of RST, a brief overview of existing theories will be given. Since several excellent and detailed reviews of current theories are already available (Bognanno, 2014;Conyon, 2006;Devers et al, 2007;Otten, 2007), our systematic outline of the "efficient market" and the "managerial power" theory will be brief. Subsequently, we will add a systematic discussion of the relational signalling theory.…”
Section: Signalling Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to determine the year-on-year analysis of the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration and business performance because of the division between ownership and management in these companies. This leads to an agency problem, whereby managers follow their self-interest above the interest of stakeholders (Bognanno, 2014;Kang, Kumar, & Lee, 2006). This is specifically true in the SOCs' environment because the principal is unable to monitor the CEO as the agent (Li & Xia, 2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%