2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm) 2014
DOI: 10.1109/smartgridcomm.2014.7007735
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Efficient incentive-driven consumption curtailment mechanisms in Nega-Watt markets

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Cited by 9 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…These market-driven methods promise substantial benefits for the consumers (e.g. electricity bill savings), as well 1 Part of the material appeared in [1], in IEEE SmartGridComm 2014. as for the operators (e.g. lower wholesale prices), and they aid in better control of the system.…”
Section: A Concept and Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These market-driven methods promise substantial benefits for the consumers (e.g. electricity bill savings), as well 1 Part of the material appeared in [1], in IEEE SmartGridComm 2014. as for the operators (e.g. lower wholesale prices), and they aid in better control of the system.…”
Section: A Concept and Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One possible application is in the Nega-Watt market where utility operators aim to curtail a portion of the system demand during certain time periods [26]. For example, during a critical peak event, the critically high demand may cause a system shutdown and a blackout if not well accounted for by curtailing load from selected consumers.…”
Section: Demand Side Management Applicationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Those methods are utilized in designing proper incentives for interruptible load management. Studies [8][9][10][11] use Stackelberg game theory for modeling the interaction between the service provider and customers from the point of view of a grid operator. In Stackelberg game-theoretic modeling approaches, each party in the DR model has a distinct objective function.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%