Efficient implementation of masked AES on Side-Channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board

Masoumi, Massoud; Habibi, Pouya; Jadidi, Majid

doi:10.1109/i-society.2015.7366878

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Some of the effects of SCA on AES are listed in Ref. [14,15]. Methods which neutralize the effect of SCA on AES are also proposed and detailed explanation of those methods is given in the Ref.…”

Section: Addroundkey Transformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Effective Software Based Method to Analyze SCA Countermeasures for Advanced Encryption Standard

Kumar

Karthigaikumar

2021

Wireless Pers Commun

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As everyone is aware that all the recently introduced networks systems are in need of significant security measures and by having a separate hardware architecture for the cryptographic function, necessary high level data protection can be achieved. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is one of the best cryptographic algorithms to provide such high level security but it can be exploited because of its quantifiable power consumption. Recent advancement in technology uses this power consumption value to find the secret key value with the mathematical steps used in the algorithm during encryption process. This method of obtaining secret key with the power consumption is known as Side-Channel Attacks. Even though several dedicated hardware is available for analyzing the AES weakness related to SCA, but its implantation is quite difficult because of high cost or the synchronization problem between the AES implementing architecture and the power sampling rate of Analog to Digital Convertors or bandwidth of the oscilloscopes. In this research work, we proposed a technique for the purpose of Correlation and Differential Power Analysis for the FPGA implementations of AES cryptographic hardware architecture. Results from this research are used to create a detailed model of the AES power consumption with the help of advanced mathematical and statistical measures. With this research work, it is possible to provide the scenario of SCA attacks in real time without having any additional architecture for the power sampling analysis and clock frequency synchronization. Therefore the result of this research work can be used as a preventive measure of SCA attacks in the design process itself, thereby reducing the burdening of designers.

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Section: Addroundkey Transformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Effective Software Based Method to Analyze SCA Countermeasures for Advanced Encryption Standard

Kumar

Karthigaikumar

2021

Wireless Pers Commun

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“…In contrast to hiding techniques, masking techniques are applied on the algorithmic level and randomize the intermediate values of the computation or by adding dummy instructions to avoid dependencies between the internal operation and the leaked side-channel information without changing the original functionality of the design [3,4]. In [23], Nikova et al propose a threshold implementation (TI) countermeasure against first-order DPA based on secretsharing.…”

Section: Side-channel Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To mitigate the risk of side-channel attacks, countermeasures such as message hiding [2] and masking technique [3,4] are presented in the literature. The objective of such techniques is to increase the time required to reveal the secret key thereby protect cryptographic implementations from different side-channel attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks

et al. 2020

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Side-channel analysis is a non-invasive form of attack that reveals the secret key of the cryptographic circuit by analyzing the leaked physical information. The traditional brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks target the weakness in the encryption algorithm, whereas side-channel attacks use statistical models such as differential analysis and correlation analysis on the leaked information gained from the cryptographic device during the run-time. As a non-invasive and passive attack, the side-channel attack brings a lot of difficulties for detection and defense. In this work, we propose a key update scheme as a countermeasure for power and electromagnetic analysis-based attacks on the cryptographic device. The proposed countermeasure utilizes a secure coprocessor to provide secure key generation and storage in a trusted environment. The experimental results show that the proposed key update scheme can mitigate side-channel attacks significantly.

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“…Many information about the weaknesses of the AES when implemented in hardware have been analysed in detail in several research projects [14] and some authors have highlighted the threat of power-based SCAs [15]. To solve the power emission vulnerability, various SCA countermeasures have been proposed based on modifying the AES circuit in order to change the power emission [16] and the robustness of SCA solutions has also been evaluated and characterized [17]. When attacking an AES implementation with CPA or DPA, the attack requires to target a certain element of the circuit whose logic state depends on the secret data to be extracted and a function F() which determines its state.…”

Section: Side-channel Attacks On Hardwarementioning

confidence: 99%

A simulated approach to evaluate side-channel attack countermeasures for the Advanced Encryption Standard

et al. 2019

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Modern networks have critical security needs and a suitable level of protection and performance is usually achieved with the use of dedicated hardware cryptographic cores. Although the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is considered the best approach when symmetric cryptography is required, one of its main weaknesses lies in its measurable power consumption. Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) use this emitted power to analyse and revert the mathematical steps and extract the encryption key. Nowadays they exist several dedicated equipments and workstations for SCA weaknesses analysis and the evaluation of the related countermeasures, but they can present significant drawbacks as an high cost for the instrumentation or, in case of cheaper instrumentation, the need to underclock the physical circuit implementing the AES cipher, in order to adapt the circuit clock frequency accordingly to the power sampling rate of ADCs or oscilloscopes bandwidth. In this work we proposed a methodology for Correlation and Differential Power Analysis against hardware implementations of an AES core, relying only on a simulative approach. Our solution extracts simulated power traces from a gate-level netlist and then elaborates them using mathematical-statistical procedures. The main advantage of our solution is that it allows to emulate a real attack scenario based on emitted power analysis, without requiring any additional physical circuit or dedicated equipment for power samples acquisition, neither modifying the working conditions of the target application context (such as the circuit clock frequency). Thus our approach can be used to validate and benchmark any SCA countermeasure during an early step of the design, thereby shortening and helping the designers to find the best solution during a preliminary phase and potentially without additional costs.

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Efficient implementation of masked AES on Side-Channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board

Cited by 9 publications

References 10 publications

An Effective Software Based Method to Analyze SCA Countermeasures for Advanced Encryption Standard

An Effective Software Based Method to Analyze SCA Countermeasures for Advanced Encryption Standard

Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks

A simulated approach to evaluate side-channel attack countermeasures for the Advanced Encryption Standard

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