Efficient Conversion Method from Arithmetic to Boolean Masking in Constrained Devices

Won, Yoo-Seung; Han, Dong‐Guk

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64647-3_8

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Unlike previous studies in which LUTs were always used, our proposals overcome side-channel vulnerabilities in address bits and memory usage. Our constant ADD is an extended version of the methods employed by prior studies [20,21] (Appendix A). The proposed algorithm is a software-optimized Kogge-Stone adder (KS adder), and it can calculate multi-word codewords.…”

Section: A New Dual-rail-based Power-balancing Countermeasure Withoutmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Briefly, the KS adder in the software proposed by Coron et al did not consider carry bits for multi-word processing [20]. Won et al proposed an algorithm that calculates carry bits, but the algorithm is inefficient because it deals with carry bits as a decimal point [21]. We propose an optimized algorithm based on the fact that a carry bit in lower words does not exceed 1.…”

Section: A New Dual-rail-based Power-balancing Countermeasure Withoutmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Coron et al expanded the KS adder that was designed using operators that are supported by general software such as XOR, AND, and SHIFT [20]. Won et al developed the KS adder to handle multi-word data [21]. Each algorithm is summarized in Appendix A. Additionally, the papers of Coron et al and Won et al are mainly about implementing the KS-adder in software, not related to PB methods.…”

Section: Constant Add Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power-Balancing Software Implementation to Mitigate Side-Channel Attacks without Using Look-Up Tables

Kim

Hong

2020

Applied Sciences

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With the increasing number of side-channel attacks, countermeasure designers continue to develop various implementations to address such threats. Power-balancing (PB) methods hold the number of 1s and/or transitions (i.e., Hamming weight/distance) of internal processes constant to ensure side-channel safety in an environment in which it is difficult to use random numbers. Most existing studies employed look-up tables (LUTs) to compute those operations, except for XOR and NOT operations. However, LUT-based schemes exhibit some side-channel issues in the address bits of LUTs. In this paper, we propose the application of AND and ADD operations to PB methods based on a rule that encodes 8-bit data into a 32-bit codeword without using LUTs. Unlike previous studies that employed LUTs, our proposals overcome side-channel vulnerabilities associated with the address bits and memory wastage. In addition, we evaluate the side-channel security ensured by the proposed method in comparison with that ensured by other methods. Finally, we apply our methods to SIMON/SPECK ciphers and analyze their performance by comparing them with older schemes.

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Section: A New Dual-rail-based Power-balancing Countermeasure Withoutmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A New Dual-rail-based Power-balancing Countermeasure Withoutmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Constant Add Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power-Balancing Software Implementation to Mitigate Side-Channel Attacks without Using Look-Up Tables

Kim

Hong

2020

Applied Sciences

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“…In addition to the above two, Schneider et al [21] discussed an efficient hardware implementation of the conversion. Won and Han [22] modified the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder with a divide and conquer approach.…”

Section: First-order Boolean and Arithmetic Maskingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrative Acceleration of First-order Boolean Masking for Embedded IoT Devices

Komano

Shimizu

2019

Journal of Information Processing

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Physical attacks, especially side-channel attacks, are threats to IoT devices which are located everywhere in the field; and therefore, protecting such devices against side-channel attacks is one of our emerging issues. Toward that, Coron et al. gave an efficient arithmetic-to-Boolean mask conversion algorithm which enables us to protect cryptographic algorithms including arithmetic operations, such as hash functions, from the attacks. Recently, Biryukov et al. improved it by locally optimizing subroutines of the conversion algorithm. In this paper, we revisit the algorithm. Unlike Biryukov et al., we improve the Coron et al.'s algorithm with integrative optimizations over the subroutines. The gains against these algorithms are about 22.6% and 7.0% in the general setting. We also apply our algorithm to HMAC-SHA-1 and have an experiment to show that the implementation on a test vehicle smartcard leaks no sensitive information, i.e., secure against the first-order side-channel attack, with the ISO/IEC17825 test.

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“…A few countermeasures to protect the AND operation are suggested in [2]. Moreover, many suggestions [24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32] have been proposed with respect to the Addition operation.…”

Section: Countermeasure For Block Cipher Seedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Side Channel Leakages Against Financial IC Card of the Republic of Korea

2018

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Integrated circuit (IC) chip cards are commonly used in payment system applications since they can provide security and convenience simultaneously. More precisely, Europay, MasterCard, and VISA (EMV) are widely known to be well equipped with security frameworks that can defend against malicious attacks. On the other hand, there are other payment system applications at the national level. In the case of the Republic of Korea, standards for financial IC card specifications are established by the Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute. Furthermore, security features defending against timing analysis, power analysis, electromagnetic analysis, and TEMPEST are required. This paper identifies side channel leakages in the financial IC cards of the Republic of Korea, although there may be side channel countermeasures. Side channel leakages in the financial IC cards of the Republic of Korea are identified for the first time since the side channel countermeasures were included in the standards. The countermeasure that is applied to the IC card from a black box perspective is estimated to measure security features against power analysis. Then, in order to investigate whether an underlying countermeasure is applied, first-order and second-order power analyses are performed on the main target, e.g., a S-box of the block cipher SEED that is employed in the financial system. Furthermore, the latest proposal in ICISC 2017 is examined to apply block cipher SEED to the financial IC card protocol. As a result, it is possible to identify some side channel leakages while expanding the lemma of the paper accepted in ICISC 2017. Algebraic logic is also constructed to recover the master key from some round keys. Finally, it is found that only 20,000 traces are required to find the master key.

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Efficient Conversion Method from Arithmetic to Boolean Masking in Constrained Devices

Cited by 6 publications

References 11 publications

Power-Balancing Software Implementation to Mitigate Side-Channel Attacks without Using Look-Up Tables

Power-Balancing Software Implementation to Mitigate Side-Channel Attacks without Using Look-Up Tables

Integrative Acceleration of First-order Boolean Masking for Embedded IoT Devices

Side Channel Leakages Against Financial IC Card of the Republic of Korea

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